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This thesis discusses design considerations for
Lanchester-Type Models of Warfare (LATMW) . It
establishes a framework for setting minimum design
standards for such combat models. We formalize these
considerations in a Minimum Evaluation Framework (MEF)
for combat models. The state-of-the-art for models is
briefly reviewed and major pitfalls in modelling
combat are sketched. We show how to avoid such
shortcomings by following our MEF specifications.
Modern combined arms forces are abstracted as coherent
systems of complementary and supplementary components.
We derive a method to refine Lanchester Attrition-Rate
Coefficients (LARC) as system capability measures by
additionally considering reliability and availability
weightings. Examples are given to demonstrate the
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I. BACKGROUND AND INTRODUCTION
Commenting on the efficient achievement of military
objectives. Hitch and McKean have stated that: "Strategy,
technology and economy are not three independent
considerations to be assigned appropriate weights, but
interdependent elements of the same problem. Strategies are
ways of using budgets or resources to achieve military
objectives. Technology defines the possible strategies. The
economic problem is to choose that strategy, including
equipment and everything else necessary to implement it,
which is most efficient (maximizes the attainment of the
objective with the given resources) or economical (minimizes
the cost of achieving the given objective) - the strategy
which is most efficient also being the most economical"[ 1 ].
Development of nuclear warheads in the past decades
challenged Operations Analysts to model and analyze the
economic war potentials of the leading superpowers, the
United States and Soviet Union. Kosta Tsipis presented in
[2] a mathematical model that relates technological
performance parameters (lethality of a nuclear warhead,
accuracy of landing warheads) to the overall yield of
destruction. The approach is to numerically combine
empirical estimates (inputs) with their effective return
(output) according to the micro and macroeconomic concepts
of production functions (for exact definitions see [3],
[4]). Valuing inputs by their costs permits determination of
optimal input combinations for a given output. Further
examination of isoquant aad isocost curves (see also [3])
constitute the key aspect of cost effectiveness analysis.
Thus, large scale input-output analysis (due to Leontief
8

[5]) in exercising the Electric Five Year Defense Plan
System (see excellent discussion in [6]) is feasible. This
methodology, proposed by the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Systems Analysis) , utilizes production
and cost functions, obtainable from input-output (or
transaction) tables in a similar fashion as the Department
of Commerce [7]. The Tsipis model and the Five Year Defense
Plan System can therefore be viewed as basic methodologies
for the application of Operations Research to strategic
planning problems (i.e. as stated by Morse and Kimball,
"applying the scientific methods to provide executive
departments with a guantitative basis for alternative
decisions regarding the operations under their control"
[8]). The use of nuclear weapons form the backbone of the
Shield/Sword doctrine of the NATO. The United States
Government is able to estimate with scientific methods the
hypothesized nuclear power, the Sword, in America's NATO
committment.
The Shield or the strength of the General Purpose Forces
(ground combat forces, tactical air forces and mobility
forces; see [9] for definitions) as the second hypothesis of
the doctrine faces heavy critigues. For example, "NATO's
forces are maldesigned [10]"; "Proferred solutions to NATO's
conventional force inferiority, derived from economic
efficiency considerations, would at best release marginal
resources to buy more of NATO's misstructured forces [11]"-
Moreover the scenario for NATO and Warsaw Pact is
affected by considerable changes still in progress:
1. Increase of the ground combat forces of the Warsaw Pact
since 1968 (military personnel plus 22%, tanks plus
40%, artillery plus 60% [13])
2. Industrial potential change (for large scale war
systems the industrial capacity ratio is 5 to 1 in

favour of the Soviet Union [13])
3. Management change in 1976: the choice of Dimitrij
Ustinov as secretary of defense of the Soviet Union,
known as an expert to successfully handle the Warsaw
Pact's military industrial complex [13]
4. Restrictions in military budget planning for all NATO
members in favour of other current competing and urgent
public problems.
At NATO»s semiannual spring meeting (1976), the foreign
ministers of the fifteen NATO powers bluntly warned the
Soviet Union that the continued arms build up of Warsaw Pact
forces beyond legitimate needs for defense is pushing the
world into an arms race of dangerous dimensions. They also
pledged the determination of their governments to take
measures necessary to maintain and improve the efficiency of
their forces as an essential safeguard to the security of
member countries, whether against military aggression or
political pressure [14]. As a consequence, NATO gradually
adjusts the Shield/Sword doctrine to the doctrine of the
Triad: neither conventional, nor tactical nuclear, nor
strategic nuclear forces may substitute each other; each
component plays an adequate single role in their combined
effort to guarantee deterrence.
The western defense management is therefore urged to
quantify effectiveness of all alternative forces and
weapons, i. e. analytical models with empirically based
numerical descriptors of the outcomes of different
strategies and tactics are needed that indicate how to cost
efficiently solve these complex problems.
Available combat models that asses the sword of the
Atlantic Organization have been questioned as to their
ability to produce realistic estimates of convential force
10

capabilities [12]. However, the combat modelling community
is aware of such shortcomings and has identified modelling
aspects that need particular attention [20], [21], [70].
Consequently, the following recent publications illustrate
attempts at improving the state-of-the-art of combat models
by adressing these problem areas: [15], [16], [17], [18],
[ 19] and [70 ].
Alternative decisions concerning the General Purpose
Forces affect highly scarce economic resources. Our work
concentrates on formulating better inputs into large scale
combat models using LATMW and to draw cost/effectiveness
conclusions by exercising these models. In particular, we
establish a Minimum Evaluation Framework (MEF) for combat
models by considering the decission process that ensures the
expected quality of answers that the top defense management
seeks by means of analyzing results obtained from combat
models. In other words, this thesis develops specific
design specifications for such models. After developing our
MEF we sketch the typical pitfalls observable in current
models that could have been avoided by considering such
specifications.
Examination of very simple Lanchester-type models like
Lanchester's original combat formulations (see[ 28 ]) with
respect to our MEF naturally reveals some shortcomings. We
overcome these by our development of the Concept of
Estimable Rates. More explicitly, we weight the performance
oriented effectiveness quantification of General Purpose
Forces' weapon systems (i.e. the Lanchester Attrition-Rate
coefficients) by estimable reliabilities and availabilities.
Our first refinements for these measures of effectiveness
however, remain still based on hardware performance. We view
therefore modern weapons of combined arms forces as coherent
systems with additional components such as human operators,
i.e. their behaviorial effects (morale, suppression,
11

decisions) , environment of deployment and logistical
consumption for example. A simple procedure to gain their
estimable failure rates is explicitly presented, i. e. we
show how to utilize war games, simulations, field or map
exercises, experiments, operational tests, built combat
models, military judgement or war data. These formulations
allow us a fairly extended refinement of Lanchester
attrition rate coefficients by reliability and availility
weightings. Consistent abstractions of complex and
interactive factors describe the worth of weapon systems in
modern warfare scenarios, simultaneously all specifications
of our MEF for combat models are satisfied.
These new design considerations for LATMW produce
refined Lanchester attrition-rate coefficients that are also
numerical inputs for costed system effectiveness
quantifications useful in an Input-Output analysis, i.e. we
investigate our refined Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficients and develop a method that extracts from these
effectiveness quantifications (i.e. Net-operational times)
for force postures, commodity levels, and for the elements
of the net-output vector as inputs into the transaction
tableau. A first-cut sector theater level differential model
is added that delivers with our improved modelling
formulations, if exercised, alternatives for given
hypothetical scenarios that can be costed out. Finally, we
suggest topic areas upon which future research, model
building, and operational testing should focus in order to
provide better inputs for LATMW. This will hopefully allow




II. GENERAL aODELLING CONSIDERATIONS
The deployment of strategic nuclear warheads may be
relatively easy analyzed with respect to their physical
effects (for a thorough and detailed discussion see [2]).
Conventional forces, on the other hand, perform as a
combined arms team. Large numbers of weapon systems
complement and supplement each other. Besides of the
coordination of hardware systems there are also many
soldiers of different branches required to manage these
systems effectively. Their decisions and behavorial
responses in different combat situations influence highly
the course of actions. Assets for these combined arms teams,
i.e. for their hardware systems and for the operating
personnel have to be coordinated at a very high level.
Therefore, one has to quantify measures of effectiveness
(MOE) for combat systems that express the contribution of
all components to the system's worth. It is only when we
view a very large unit (the systems organized as divisions
or a corps) that we can realistically portray large scale
combat interactions. We have to be more articulate, for
example, what large scale and interdependent battle process
in physical terms really mean. The Table of Organization
and Equipment for only one armored division lists numbers
for personnel in the order of thousands and for weapon
systems in fairly multiples of hundreds. Even, if a division
is labeled as an armor division, all mission direct and
mission support units with various specific technical
equipment and trained skills are present in one armored
division. The focal point of such a division is naturally
the tank, but one shouldn't underestimate that its main
strength is highly dependent upon the coordinated and
13

combined efforts of all branches. The effectiveness of the
phalanxes of todays nonnuclear forces is not only some
function of their main weapon systems, but also that of many
support personnel. The combined arms effort in a large
scale scenario is produced by many similar and different
organized combined arms divisions.
Keeping only brief indicators of modern forces'
structure in mind, it is obvious that engagements with
opposed forces constitute very complicated processes on a
battlefield that covers huge geographical dimensions. We
have to abstract, aggregate and interpolate to scale ground
combat down to a manageable size for military modellers. At
the same time, analysis of General-Purpose-Force problems is
much more sensitive to extrapolations from these
artificially diminishing scales of the real world
complexity. There are basically four approaches to
modelling large scale combat between General-Purpose-Forces.
War gaming, simulation, analytical (math) models, and any
combination of these. Since the above combat modelling
approaches have been discussed in detail elsewhere (see
[20], [21], [22], [23], [70] e.g.), we will concentrate on
requirements for any evaluative study of ground combat.
Seth Bonder has said:
"...Combat models that are developed should contain a
high degree of logical fidelity with the real world and,
where possible, be isomorphic to it. Thus model developers
are, in a sense, driven to the development of complex,
highly sophisticated, detailed simulations of the combat
process"
.
The author feels that a combat model should, moreover,
be designed according to what questions must be answered in
a defense planning study. Thus, the combat modelling
community needs guidance for directing these modelling
14

efforts. What one builds into the model depends on many
factors, the military situation, the combat elements, the
available resources, including cost aspects, and the
anticipated battle outcomes for example. For each combined
arms operation we have to
-first, identify the major factors that contribute to
answers to the adressed question in a combat model
-secondly, choose the scientific method that claims to
represent most adequately combined arms effort and
-third, free these complex formulations of interactive
factors from pitfalls often encountered in current modelling
techniques, such as
1. performance driven




4. cost operational effectiveness relations.
A. MINIMUM EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (MEF) FOR COMBAT MODELS
All models, especially, those for military operations of
Ground Combat Forces, must abstract from the real world. We
now consider determining the lower bounds for such
abstractions in combat models, i.e. the minimum amount of
detail (or resolution) to be considered in such models.
Micro and Macroeconomics faces the same problem. A perfect
model for a free enterprise firm is, as such, impossible,
just as a comprehensive abstraction of the entire economy of
any country is not possible. Feasibility and tractability
15

are common features representing a single firm,
aggregations, interdependence and connections of firms to
the market or their subordinate roles in an economy that
indicate their overall functioning. Since allocating scarce
resources is the same motive power for micro/macroeconomic
and military alternative decisions, we have to identify
those components which are sufficient and also commonly
accepted (as in the economic theory) , as the main
contributors for the functioning of complex military actions
such as battles.
Classic Military Science developed its know-how
basically from history and personal experience. After the
second world war, empirical sciences gradually entered the
scene as accepted and helpful tools for aiding military
decision making and planning. [It should be noted that
Lanchester's original work, as the first sucessful attempt
to scientifically formulate combat problems, dates to 1914
and its use began after World War II]. It is therefore not
astonishing that a critical overview of existing combat
models may roughly be summarized as: they claim to assess,
combined arms forces actions scientifically but are
sometimes far off in doing so. Many others express similar
critiques that ask for justification and proposals to
improve the situation. Stockfisch, for example, said in [21]
p 128-129: "To obtain better insights into combat
operations, hard thinking and testable models about tactics
are necessary. However, this effort must be subject to and
can be augmented by testing and other empirical endeavours
related to activities that, troops carry out".
It is the author's hypothesis that the shortcomings of
current combat models are primarily due to the environment
in which they are created. Unfortunately, decision makers
never explicitly tell (and one does not expect them to)
Operations Research analysts what should be included in a
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model, much less establish tolerable or minimum bounds on
the specifications for combat models. The observable
circulus virtosus is this: the modelling community is asked
to build combat models without being specifically provided
with common facts that military experience could provide and
which highly influence research objectives. Too much effort
must be spent in adjusting different points of view. For
example, every military commander appreciates tank
performance capabilities, but, at the same time, he is also
aware that high performance is only effective, if many other
required environment conditions favour the deployment of
tanks. Combat models start now gradually to formulate these
type of actions and try to account for combined arms
problems that really military planner and practitioner like
to be analyzed. In 1967 one of DIVTAG's [41] six research
objectives was: investigate the feasibility of combining
tactical and logistical aspects into a single combat
assessment procedure. Tactical und logistical aspects are
immanent in any combat action. This research task could have
been more articulate with respect to what logistical aspects
should be formulated, if one had only remembered and
analyzed General Eisenhower's statement "logistics
influences all battles and decides most of them-*'
.
Before we outline our MEF for LATMW, let us consider a
very analogous situation for abstracting combat processes.
STANAG 2014 [45] provides the minimum amount of information
necessary to derive military decisions for complex combat
actions. Any military commander must be informed of the
following:
1. Situation - enemy forces - friendly forces
- attacheraents and detachements
2. Mission
3. Execution - concept of operation -general instruction
17

for mission accomplishment - organization of combat
- miscellaneous instructions - coordinating
instructions
4. Administration and logistics
5. Command and signal.
Given this information, a military commander can start to
analyze the possibilities for enemy and friendly forces. The
identification of alternative courses of actions and their
relation to the scenario and mission depend on his decision
process. The concluding phase of this analysis is to
compare all alternatives and determine the "best" one. We
observe that STANAG 2014 provides sufficient information to
make an intelligent decision for any military action at any
level of command.
Consequently, we take the above scheme as a point of
departure for building combat models. We do so because it
includes all data and information required to formulate
(abstract) complex combat systems' actions. Therefore,
every quantification of information that aids (viewed as a
minimum) in describing combat interactive dynamics has to be
present in combat models in a transparent numerical form,
i.e. we call for mathematical descriptions that express the
overall combined arms systems (organizations such as an
armored division for example) performance and their
effectiveness in LATMW. Thus, Situation (scenario) , Mission
(objective of combat action) , Execution (doctrine and
tactics) , Administration and Logistics (allocation,
consumption and replacement of resources) and Command and
Signal (managing and coordinating techniques to lead units)
,
as STANAG 2014's elements, establish a first set of a HEF
specification that must be addressed with any combat
modelling technique. In order to accurately predict combat
effectiveness a combat model must also include the
representation of the human interaction, i.e. the impact of
18

human behaviour, morale and decisions with regard to
combined arms teams performance and effectiveness. As a
military commander takes all these problems into account in
estimating combat outcomes, a combat model must also
represent such factors (and in a quantitative fashion) . The
next requirement for a MEF is that the dynamic nature of
combat, i.e. the change of effectiveness of combined arms
actions due to varying and interdependent effects of parts
or of complete subunits, must be explicitly formulated.
Furthermore, combat models have to be designed so that all
allocated assets for combat units can be costed out and be
compared with respect to their contribution to different
battle outcomes. In the author's view, these are MEF
requirements whose quantification must only be performed
with the Scientific Method. Military concepts and logical
rules are then testable and whenever possible verifiable and
validable with empirical observations. It is obvious that
combat prediction will almost have to be completely done
without a large number of field experiments and operational
tests because of their high cost. Furthermore, even field
experiments and operational testing are extremely artificial
because of safety restrictions. Representative military
judgement based on history data and personal experience and
realistic expectation may then serve as a helpful and
consistent surrogate to obtain estimates without any
degrading effect to the worth of the scientific approach.
In essence, we demand from combat modelers that they use
only verified and validated assumptions in formulating
abstracted combat dynamics in a combat model.
We list now more schematically our MEF requirements that
are applicable for modelling of combat, regardless of which
modelling technique is chosen to abstract combat (Note that
the framework for effective fire support analysis, lately
published in [70] Appendix 2, may be viewed as an attempt to
schematise the analysis procedure given that a combat model
19

exists that addresses our MEF specifications)
.
Minimun Evaluation (MEF) Specifications:
(1) Abstraction and numerical representation of
interdependent combat elements, their capability,
availability and reliability using the scheme of STANAG 2014
to describe combat element's performance (measures of
performance (MOP) ) .
(2) Abstraction and numerical representation of the
functional relationship between performance criteria and
their effectiveness in the combat process to assess the
systems' contributing worth, i.e. aggregate consistent MOP
to measures of effectiveness (MOE) analog the concept of a
production function on the data base given by STANAG 2014.
(3) Costing of the allocated scarce resources as inputs for
alternative effectiveness criteria (outputs).
(4) Assurance of the simultaneous, repetitive and
interdependent modelling of (1), (2) and (3) above and, not
in parallel or in series.
(5) Representation of the human interface, either
descriptive or presumptive, i.e. human behaviour and
decisions are initiated by causes and influence systems'
effectiveness at any time.
(6) Allowance for verification and validation in (1) to (5)
above, i.e. Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
(RDT&E) , history data and military judgement.




Figure 1 - MINIMUM EVALUATION FRAMEWORK
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Fig 1 puts the MEF in a graphical context, the arrows
indicating the interdependence of each factor. The figure
represents only a snapshot of the necessary repetition and
feedback of interactions over a continuum of action, either
continously or discrete assessed with respect to a time
axis. The terminology of STANAG 2014 is marked accordingly
by the ordering numbers of their headings and abbreviations
are explained by the legend.,
Legend for Fig 1
COEA = Cost Operational Effectiveness Analysis
CRA = Capability, Reliability, Availability
DOD = Department of Defence
MOE = Measures of Effectiveness
RDT&E = Research Development Test and Evaluation
VV = Verification and Validita tion.
Fig 2 incorporates the MEF for combat models into the
Cone of Abstraction (presented in [46] in connection with
DYNTACS, which takes some of our proposed features
consistently into consideration) , indicating their value at
any level (high or low resolution) and conseguently at each
level of command. Major pitfalls in current combat models,
discussed in detail hereafter, are located where they might
occur in this total MEF, thus yielding a complete management







Figure 2 - MINIMUM EVALUATION FRAMEWORK AND THE CONE OF
ABSTRACTION FOR COMBAT MODELS
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B. MAJOR PITFALLS IN COMBAT MODELS
Modelling ground combat at a very low level of
resolution bears the danger to abstract and aggregate many
combat interactions and duels of engaged units and branches
in concise combat processes with unsound or unverified and
unvalidated modelling means. Mathematical formulations, for
example, may simplify sometimes combat dynamic descriptions
to such an extent that inhearent features of a battle may
either be suppressed or modeled with inadequate weights. On
the other hand, in the attempt to overcome the problem of
aggregating different levels of resolution one states
assumptions in order to be able to model as much as possible
of all identified interactions, at least as a rough-cut
which by a further model development and compared to other
modelling problems are viewed as first successful attempts
to assist in formulating the complexity of problems at all.
Finally, such a model gets completed and exercised to aid
the military management in Cost Operational Effectiveness
Analysis (COEA) studies. Military decision makers call for
these combat models primarily in the belief that extended
and detailed research and empiricisism rectifies all
assumptions and formulations that went into the model.
Managers hope in applying models to be able to assess combat
at higher levels of resolution. They don't therefore expect
modelling pitfalls in the abstraction and formulation of
modern General-Purpose-Force problems with the aid of a
concise model. He discuss now in detail major aspects that
help to indentify shortcomings in models of which the most
model users aren't aware of.
24

1 • Performanc e djri ven Models
Technology changes altered the nature of combat.
Modern technology provides capabilities. Tactics are
designed to take advantage of these capabilities. The
invention of the gunpowder replaced the duels of mercenaries
with swords by fights that are determined by the skill to
handle automatic rifles and the precission of predicting the
time of a projectile's flight to the target. Cover and
concealment protect now mainly soldiers that are far apart
in fox-holes just like the shield prevented them from hits
with sharp edges launched by very close opponents. More
recent inventions and engineering efforts highlighted with
radar, missiles, atomic energy, computer and lazer enable us
to utilize highly technical equipment in modern strategies
and tactics. We have the speed and agility of cross-country
armored vehicles available to cross terrain that couldn't be
passed by infantry-men or the possibility to acquire targets
with infra-red sensors to fight in darkness, to name only
some examples that lead to modern tactics. The main point,
however, is that soldiers of today highly depend on the
performance of their supporting hard ware systems. This fact
enforces modelling of technical performance in detail and
introduces the dominance of hardware system considerations
in combat models. Numerical expressions relate performance
of these systems (in this connection only of weapon systems)
to their capabilities. It is often assumed that all
technical equipment is one hundred percent available and
also one hundred percent reliable in the actual operational
environment, i.e. the utilization of the performance
capabilities is only always hypothetically available and
reliable during the mission time. The extent to which a
system may be expected to achieve a set of specific mission
25

requirements is not only a function of capability, but also
of availability and reliability. Consequently, in
overemphasizing measures of performance in models, questions
that can only be answered by measuring systems effectiveness
get a barely satisfactory answer. The nature of system
effectiveness is a functional relationship of availability,
reliability and capability in accordance with [66].
Since we consider differential combat models, or
LATMW, we investigate the currently applied system
effectiveness quantifications by examining Lanchester
attrition-rate coefficients (LARC). Cherry gives in [70]
Appendix 4 p 3-12, an explicit presentation of how LARC's
for heterogeneous forces are formulated. For the i-th Blue
group weapons that fire against the j-th Red group targets
at a range (r) , the attrition coefficient for the 31ue group
is denoted by a (r) (compare for more detail our First
ij
Example for Pitfalls in Measurement Scales) . These attrition
coefficients are claiaed to be notably extended in a
high-powered modelling sense. They are decomposed in several
ra,tes:
-rate at which an individual system in the i-th Blue group
destroys live j-th group Red targets at range r when it is
firing at them
-the allocation factor (proportion of the i-th group Blue
systems assigned to fire on the j-th group Red targets which
are at range r )
-the intelligence factor (proportion of the i-th group
firing Blue weapons allocated to the j-th Red group which
are actually engaging live j-th group targets at range r)
.
Performance is inherent in these attrition rates and
drives as a capability measure battle outcomes. LARC are
26

mainly assumed to be dependent on a multiple of physical
parameters of a weapon system describing their capabilities.
It is also claimed (without any explicit proof) that for any
weapon-target pair values for attrition rates are obtainable
that are related to properties such as concealment, cover,
roughness, exposure, movement etc.. One is therefore forced
to ask: Are there valuable and verifiable functional
relationships available at all to formulate such a refined
utilization of heterogeneous forces' capabilities? In the
discussion cf our First Example for Pitfalls in Measurement
Scales we show explicitly why it is very important to direct
this question to modelling approaches and techniques, and to
the assumptions that lead to them.
There are two different basic approaches for
estimating LARC's. One can use either the Bonder/Barfoot
methodology (for a specific treatment see [24], [25], [26])
or the statistical maximum likelihood estimation from Monte
Carlo Simulation outputs (Clark's methodology, see [27]).
Both are performance oriented and allow only performance
based alternatives for military cost effective decisions.
If no sound methodology to refine LARC's exists
(documentation of VECTOR-II doesn't show it), then we could
only derive from these performance quantifications that
drive battle outcomes in models estimates for systems which
perform best assuming they operated without any failure
during the mission time. The identification of those
opponents that should be killed is one step in the plan to
defeat enemies. More decisive however, is that friendly
systems which are called upon to do this are at this
critical time step reliable and available to fulfil this
goal. The defense planning management is very interested in
obtaining scientific estimates to identify alternatives in
employing systems more reliable and available but less




An armored weapon system also depends on a group of
human operators to initiate, control and terminate highly
automated performance criteria. How does their reliability
and availability, i.e. their trained skills and their morale
affect the system's performance over a course of possible
actions? Performance parameters are very important system
characteristics, but not the only ones necessary to predict
and quantify systems effectiveness. Performance driven
models can only satisfy (1) , (4) and (6) of the MEF. We
derive in our Specific Modelling Considerations a scientific
method that relates detailed combat interactions, measurable
in soft or hard properties, to an overall system's
effectiveness for combat dynamics formulated with LATMW.
2. Inconsistencies in Models
Three major types of inconsistencies that frequently
occur in combat models are
-aggregation of different levels of resolution;
-inproper choice of measurement scales;
-violation of cost effective analysis requirements.
The occurance of these inconsistencies appears to be highly
correlated, i.e. they usually occur together. They are
sometimes triggered by the assumptions made in developing
the combat model. We are aware that some problems are not
studied and understood in detail and Combat Modellers try
their best in using first-cut approximations and assumptions
that are hard to disprove or to replace by more quantitative
ones. The following statement is representative for this
situation: "...we attempt to approximate what happens in a
small period of time during a battle" [70] Appendix 4 p 4.
However, we found in studying combat models that sometimes
an unsound "attempt" assists "to approximate what happens".
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More careful and scientifical approved work could have
produced better formulations and expressions that are based
on verifiable and validiable assumptions.
Another observation of the author is that no MEF
requirements for combat models ask Combat Modellers
explicitly to state what has been achieved with the
Scientific Method and what are surrogates (no scientific
approach is known yet) to answer the addressed problems in a
combat model. There is a very qualitative difference with
respect to the worth of conclusions drawn from models
whether the results stem from scientifically valid modelling
approaches or not. The freedom to choose any "welcome" or
explorative "sounding" formulation to abstract battle
dynamics has to be limited to only scientifically valid
ones, if one chooses analytical models as an overall
framework to assess combat activities.
a. Aggregation, Suboptimization, Complexity
We discuss now pitfalls that are mainly
discovered in aggregating different levels of resolution in
one complex model. The three main problem areas with this
regard are
-inconsistent combination of
different modelling techniques and aspects;
-deriving aggregated decisions
from suboptimal aspects;
-considering too mach detail,
where more proper abstraction
could represent the complexity.
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High resolution models (see Fig 2) utilize contingency
plans on either a One-on-One or One-on-N basis for engaged
systems. Low resolution models concentrate on battle
outcomes for fl-on-N engagements. A very common approach to
overcome the high-low resolution gap in assessing
effectiveness is to use submodels that depict, performance
characteristics for One-on-One engagements, aggregate those
with an approximation, and use these as inputs for low
resolution models. If the same contingency and model
conditions hold in both (but different levels of
abstraction)
,
this may be a valid surrogate for modelling
and analysis purposes. However, combining different
modelling techniques that address different levels of
resolution yields unperraissible aggregation in a model
despite its various sensitive effects.
The current, most developed and advanced family
of differential combat models [also being the most used and
believed to be ' the representation of the state-of-the-art
(see [70])] are the VECTOR models [42], [43], [44]. Their
approach to allow detailed information (which matches most
STANAG 2014 elements) to describe heterogeneous forces






5. plans and intensions.
So-called major models, such as for command, control,
communication, intelligence, target acquisition, firepower,
logistics and supply, movement, etc. are claimed to compute,
for weapon-target pairs, the corresponding attrition rates
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for heterogeneous opposing forces at any time step a battle
is predicted. For the computation of the LARC estimates of
times and probabilities tD kill a target, as appropriate
measures, which will be required to destroy the target,
presumingly including all the other conditions of the
battle, are used to apply the Bonder/Barfoot methodology
[24], [25], [26], to determine the attrition rates.
Consider, for example, how in a major submodel
logistics and supply is evaluated. It is true that the
analytical development for LARC of Bonder/Barfoot allows us
to relate the time as a random variable T , i.e. the
ij
expected value of the time of the j-th weapon system to kill
the i-th target at a range r, to the number of rounds of an
ammunition type fired to kill a target (see explicit
treatment in [81]) . It is also true that on this data base,
the amount of ammunition resources expended, i.e. the costs
for the number of rounds fired to kill a target, can be
computed per weapon system, per time, and per location.
Inconsistent aggregation however, is to determine ammunition
consumption at this very high resolution level, but to model
resupply by means of tactical decision rules which allocate
all supplies by type from theater to sector and from sector
down through the command and control hierarchy tD maneuver
units without explicitly using a logistics network.
Logistics 1 decisive role is assessed with inconsistent
modelling techniques. The demand of ammunition is generated
at a high resolution. Logistical decision rules have to
determine in a much- less detailed form the allocation of
needed resources. Without representing the flow of materiel
explicitly through the command hierarchy, decision rules
could only assume that ammunition is distributed uniformly,
for example, among all weapon systems of the lowest member
in the represented chain of command. How can these
simplifying decision rules, to be implemented into a model
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according to preselected decisions, react in time and
immediately degrade weapon systems effectiveness of those
units that are not supplied sufficiently if shortage occurs?
A second inconsistency is also committed: weapon
system attrition in VECTOR models is determined by time and
location of the duels with the aid of a digitized map. Only
a logistics network would allow the same resolution to
determine which consuming maneuver unit is how long and by
how much affected by successful "coups" (unpredictable with
decision rules) of enemy interdictions. It is not obvious
at all how the undoubted delay of deliveries of goods and
the tremendous reduction of available resources caused by
enemy interdiction is adequately formulated, if different
levels of resolutions of modelling techniques ara combined.
We would like to point out that we therefore have reason to
believe that closer examination of other major process
modules would reveal similar inconsistent aggregations.
Quantifying only system performance in models
and aggregating these with inconsistent modelling approaches
will never allow one to scientifically and quantatively
asses the effectiveness of interdependent combat elements.
Let us elaborate further, to address logistical problems
with a major logistics and supply submodel (similar to that
we discussed above) , one could have equivalently stated the
following assumptions and modelling procedures: (1) deployed
weapon systems are one hundred percent reliable and
available during the mission time; (2) operating systems are
allowed to consume their supplies without any restrictions;
(3) only weapon system capability degrading effects are
modeled that are caused by interdiction or shortages due to
limited resources; (4) these degradings are computed in
adjusting LAHC "somewhat" (where are better estimates in the
above major submodel called logistics and supply?) at a




In other theater level combat models a different
type of inconsistency in aggregating logistical aspects (in
a later chapter we define these explicitly) may be observed.
Linear and Nonlinear programming ([32], [ 38 ], [39], [33])
offer a variety of computerized algorithm for determining
the optimal allocation of logistical resources. Such
subroutines are frequently used in combat models and assume
rational decision makers, i.e. only some constraints which
woun't change accordingly to sudden variations that are due
to combat activities are modeled. They may compute, for
example, within this limitation minimal routes for supply
trucks or maximal allocation of required supplies by tons
and type in time and location (see [15], [16]). Before we
continue to discuss the next type of inconsistency let us
give three remarks with respect to optimization methods in
combat models in general. (a) Exercising optimization
subroutines in models cover the most costly part of a model
production run (see e.g. [40], [41], [42], [43], [44] and
[97]). (b) Optimization methods are very suitabla modelling
tools also for other than logistical aspects (e.g. to
determine optimal routes of advance or identifying high
priority targets - see an excellent overview of this topic
in [70] Appendix 6). (c) So - called quasi optimization
methods (see e.g. [97]) try to approximate mathematical
conditions ("Kuhn-Tucker" , see for more detail [38]) with
unsound methods (see explicit proofs in [98]) that don't
yield optimal solutions for any problem. Thus, combat
models which utilize such procedures can't claim that their
model outputs are optimal ones.
In the author's view it is primarily the
computational-cost impact (computer time) of optimization
methods in models that model builders carries away to what
we now call inconsistent suboptimization. In logistics and
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supply models, allocation of resources is optimized subject
to detailed constraints, but their overall favouring or
degrading influence is aggregated in single measures as
tons, kilometers, etc.. They are then again aggregated into
functional relationships expressing the mismatch of demand
and supply proportional to total numbers of consuming
systems in a sector, neglegting constraints at all. Costs
for computer time may increase with the growing complexity
of optimization procedures implemented in models. The trend
to decrease them only in aggregating two different levels of
resolution (optimizing only one modelling aspect and
combining these results with formulations that neglegt
similar considerations in exploring the worth of these
suboptimal results) is inconsistent suboptimization, and as
such an unsound modelling attempt for an overall complex and
aggregated problem.
Although aggregation and suboptimization are
sometimes accompanied with measurement-scale inconsistencies
that we discuss later, we would like to point out that one
inconsistency either with respect to aggregation or
optimization is often the cause of all these inconsistencies
together that destroy the total quality of models. They may
still be the "best" models that we currently have because
they use other very high powered modelling techniques that
are very representative for the state-of-the-art.
The complexity of General-Purpose Forces in a
Theater-Level Campaign, and the need to represent as much as
possible of combat environments, forces us to split up
problems into a feasible and manageable size in a combat
model with the assistance of subroutines, preprocessor
models or other supplementing inputs. Evolution of the
VECTOR series claims to be: "characterized in one respect as
involving a continual decrease in the number of processes
that are decoupled from the combat viewed from the
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theaterwide perspective" [70] Appendix 4 p 35-36. Inputs
for battlefield and environment discrimination, for example
visibility, traf ficability and weather, may be specified
with state spaces at four levels for five days. This claim
holds only in accordance with this statement: "subject to
constraints imposed by computer storage and running time,
some activities whose effects are less immediate are
calculated periodically, but efforts have been directed
toward the objective of including all interactions
simultaneously whenever feasible" [70] Appendix 4 p 34. The
problem to address the complexity of ground combat in models
is not resolved satisfactorily. In describing modelling
techniques of a complex model, in [70] for example, one is
forced to the following contradiction: "Ideally, there
exists some functional relationship between the results of a
battle and the initial numbers of forces, types and
capabilities of weapon systems, the doctrine of employment,
and the environment... Unfortunately it is not known how to
construct such a function directly, nor is there sufficient
data to develop it" [70] Appendix 4 p 4. If neither
analytically nor empirically relevance permits us to specify
minimum state spaces and their levels, why are exactly four
visibility and trafficability types chosen to sufficiently
model this phenomena? The next natural question we focus on
later is: Which numerical values are used, i.e. in what
units and origins of measurement scales are these numbers?
Combat modellers are faced with the following
dilemma: The model user and consumer ask for detail for
which they themselves can't give explicit directions
verified and validated by models. Some feel exists, we have
to represent this and this... (e.g. Command, Control,
Suppression) . Model builders are then naturally forced to
use any formulation as a rough-cut (there are no indications
what is wrong or better) , which are in some sense
exploratory, but not verified and validated for applied
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analysis to assist longterm strategic and economic
decisions. The main investment for future research should
be to develop modelling methods that allow us to establish
sound formulations usable as low resolution modelling
approaches which at the same time aggregate very detailed
high resolution information.
b. Measurement - Scale Problems
In our MEF we require in (1) abstraction and
numerical representation of interdependent combat elements'
performance, availability, and reliability. Combat elements
that are modeled are also required to match the information
scope of STANAG 20 14. Therefore, one has to start out from
these MEF specifications and to try to find formulations
that address not only one, but all these aspects together.
The required amount of detail is given by the level of
resolution that is expected from a model. Without violating
these bounds interdependent combat elements may be slightly
different, but more effectively categorized to be abstracted
in components, i.e. they may be viewed as coherent systems
of:
Hardware Systems Performance
Human Behaviour and Decision
Environment Conditions imposed by
Nature and Scenario
Economic Potentials to manage these effectively.
Combat modelling asks one to abstract and numerically
represent these categories and to analyze their individual
and interdependent contributions toward a desired combined
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goal. The state-of-the-art is pretty advanced to abstract
and numerically represent physical hardware systems. The
quantifications of the costs of their assets and their
production have impact on the economic potential of a
country. Estimates for these costs are the government
expenditures, in dollars per year for example, that have to
be spent from the Gross-National product per year. This
costing procedure is relatively easy and therefore widely
used in defense planning studies (Note that no
life-cycle-costs, e.g. are considered with this method).
Hore complicated however, is to develop dynamic cost
relationships for military systems (e.g. how are
life-cycle-costs defined in consense with the cost
definitions of the traditional or modern micro and
macroeconomic theory? - see [34] and [35]). Sometimes cost
analysis studies are performed with unsound methods and we
will focus on this point in more detail later. Combat
modelling has to deal with very different types of
quantifications, for example, system costs, system
performance and effectiveness, and the influence of human
beings and environment conditions on battle processes. We
are aware that all these necessary quantifications of
complex combined arms operations involve tremendous efforts
and resources. The final product of these abstractions are
numbers to be used as inputs for analytical modals. These
numbers however, are in different units and origins and we
found that this leads to measurement scale problems that
might be viewed (compared to the scope of questions that is
addressed in combat models) as "minor" or "secondary" ones.
Moreover, only few methods are available to extract from
soft data (in a nominal, ordinal or interval scale) scale
values in a ratio scale which could relate human behaviour
and decisions or combat environmental conditions to
performance measures of systems which are in a ratio scale.
If a number gets assigned to quantify an instance of a
property of a component of a combat element it is not
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necessarily evident that limitations are imposed to perform
mathematical operations with these numbers. Since most
models are mainly concerned with performance evaluation of
hardware systems it appears to be a redundant analysis to
doubt numerical quantifications, and performed mathematical
operations, on those numbers that try to abstract human and
environmental interface for example. In the author's view
the main danger in committing pitfalls without being aware
lies in inconsistent aggregation of different measurement
scales. Therefore, detailed analysis is devotel to this
point. We start considering shortcomings in models with
respect to measurement scale problems. The investigation of
a built and an advertised model will also show us how
inconsistency in measurement scale aggregation will lead to
a multiplicity of pitfalls and/or shortcomings.
We identify two main problem areas:
-How to extract from soft information scale values that
follow a nominal scale (only classification is indicated)
,
ordinal scale (order or ranking is expressed) , interval
scale (equality of intervals is only satisfied) or a ratio
scale (equality of ratio holds)
?
-How to consistently combine information present in
different scales?
In order to resolve some of these problems we discuss the
method "Regression on Dummy Variables" (see [31]) and sketch
their limitations imposed due to the state-of-the-art.
Finally, in only using Dummy Variables we offer a powerful
method to extract from soft and hard information numerical
values in a ratio scale that can consistently be
incorporated in combat models (Note these information
quantifications for real world problems will be the basis
for our Concept of Estimable Rates that will allow us LARC




(1) First Examgle for Pitfalls in Measurement
Scales
Bonder/Barfoot's freestanding analytical
model for the LA3C offers a method to gain the most critical
coefficients needed as inputs for LATMW. The reciprocal of
the mean time a firer kills his target at a range (r)
defines the LARC. This analytical formulation includes the
following factors (see [70] Appendix 4 for implementation in
VECTOR-II)
:
-time to acquire a target
-time to fire a first round
-time to fire a round following a hit
-time to fire a round following a miss
-projectile flight time
-probability of a hit on a first round
-probability of a hit following a hit
-probability of a hit following a miss
-probability of destroying a target given it is a hit
-probability of destroying a target given it is missed
(compare for detailed development [81]).
For weapon systems that utilize single shot Markov-fire one
can only obtain estimates for these quantities based on
hardware characteristics of systems that are employed at
different ranges (r)
.
Moreover, consider again the four
visibility and trafficability types to account for
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additional environment conditions to refine LARC in the
VECTOR-II model. Our questions are:
Which regression model, or what linearly
independent estimable functions tell us that only four
visibility types are significant (if any acceptable linear
combination of factors or their levels exists at all) to
analyze the phenomena, and if so, which measures have been
chosen to represent these numerically? Footcandles, day,
night, dawn, fog?
What is their value as state variables of
the state space for attrition process submodels?
How is this analytical relationship
formulated in context with the LARC?
Since no detailed documentation is
available that would allow us to explicitly prove the
committed pitfalls we can only indicate with the above
questions how inconsistent aggregation and mix with
measurement scales has been performed. The danger of these
shortcomings lie in the possibility that by the choice of
arbitrary origins for units (who decides which are the
proper one's?) any desired model output can be yielded by
simply tuning some inputs (-scientific method-?-) .
For example, if only the numerical
representation, i.e. the choice of the wrong scale of
measurement, is other than a ratio scale for weather, then
(1),(2) and (4) of the MEF requirements are violated by the
use of a math model. It is only on quantities allowed that
yield ratio scale values to perform all mathematical
operations. The unique origin of their scales relates all
numerical expressions consistently. Thus, measurement scale
pitfalls are likely to subsume the total spectrum of
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inconsistencies and distort any farther credibility of a
scientific verification and validation. We would be
delighted to see that the state-of-the-art in combat
modelling is far more capable as we have hope to believe.
(2) Second Examp_le for Pi tfa lls in Measu rement
Scales
The vary careful documentation of [97]
allows us to present this example in detail: It is assumed
that weapon systems capabilities are expressible in
dependence of their supply requirements. Nominal supply
requirements measured in tons are known and denoted for each
battalion as NSR (nominal supply requirements) . An optimal
allocation procedure (e.g. for transportation problems see
[32]) allocate supplies from depots to each battalion,
denoting these as AS (allocated supplies) . Some scaling
factors proposed by military judgement are denoted C1, C2,
C3 (coefficients 1,2,3) respectively. The relative battalion
availability factor is dentoed as BAF and is related to the
following quantity:
c3
BAF = C1 [1-exp(-(C2 AS) /TNSR) ] , where TNSS equals the
number of battalions times the nominal supply requirements
(total nominal supply requirements) .
The choice of the exponential relationship
is rectified by the goal of this model, namely to inquire
about the relative availability of the number of weapon
systems used or, in probabilistic terms, to evaluate the
probability to be effectively equipped with a certain amount
of weapon systems simultaneously over a period of time.
Examination of this equation reveals:
(1) For C1 = 1 the expression behaves, for
any values of the other coefficients and the independent
U1

variable (i.e. the quotient of AS and TNSR) , like a
cumulative distribution function.
(2) For C1 not equal 1 these quantities may
reflect that, if C1 is greater than 1, better than, and, if
less than 1, worse than 100% performance capabilities, if
more or less than 100% supplies are available. The
temptation is great to interrupt further analysis at this
point and to incorporate this structure of information into
a complex model. What is really accomplished? To hold the
ratio of cumulative amounts (available supplies, required
supplies) constant permits any linear combination of
different supplies available and/or any linear combination
of different supplies required. The law of perfect
substitution of needed ammunition (AMMO) for petrol oil and
lubricance (POL) would have then to be true. If we don't
allow for linear combinations of AMMO and POL and treat each
supply type separately, then we are faced with the problem
of what one-to-one relationship permits us to / trade AMMO
types and/or POL types with respect to performance
capabilities, i.e. what mo.del do we use that would compute
trade-off alternatives that for example twenty tons of AMMO
for artillery units are equally effective than fifty tons of
AMMO for armor units? We have only weight or type
quantifications of goods available that are undoubtedly
necessary to manage huge amounts in transports. Preferences
attached to these numbers permit us to at best rank
different materiel classes or categories and to extract from
these scale values in an interval scale-. No relationship
exists that could tell us by how much one ton of goods is
more effective than another of a different materiel category
or class in a specific combined arms action. The lack of
these relations is one cause for the critique to use
Firepower Scores in combat models (see [20], [21]). Our
example model however, claims to be more sophisticated and
credible as this widely questioned modelling attempt, if
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used for sensitive analysis. In aggregating values that
belong to different scale value classifications we loose, as
our example reveals, scientific grounds. No perfect
substitution of supply goods is feasible and we conclude
moreover from ordinal numbers more as we are allowed to do
(see exellent tratment of scaling methods in [100]).
Next, to show that our example expression
is a distribution function for some random variable, we must
prove that four specific requirements (compare e.g. proof in
[33]) are satisfied. It can easily be shown that some of
these are violated for particular choices of C1, C2, C3.
Therefore, to choose coefficients in such a way that
probabilistic mathematical requirements are satisfied may be
especially questionable, if these choices are interpreted
after being held fixed for modelling convenience as
empirical surrogates obtainable by military judgement
(compare e.g. [16] p 535 in this connection).
As a result we would like to emphasize
again that the choice of modules (may they be ths simplest
and most plausible ones) must be sound with respect to
transformation and operator requirements imposed by
measurement scales. A model can with shortcomings of this
nature be driven to biased results that model builder and
user never intended and which any derived analysis never
gets rid of.
(3) Regression on Dummy_ Varia bles
Statisticians are well aware of the
inconsistencies that might occur in mixing or aggregating
different measurement scales. They focus only on those
properties of a soft information (in an ordinal, nominal or
interval scale) that are also common to a hard information
(in a ratio scale) . Instead of worrying about different
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origins and the units of measurable instances of a property,
they restrict themselves to the observations of states in
which a soft and/or hard information can be categorized.
More specifically, instances of a property at different
levels are either observable or not appearent. The
quantification of the possible state space is performed with
the binary numbers one or zero respectively. Therefore the
space of instance outcomes forms a set of Bernoulli
variables with dummy outcomes one or zero (these numbers are
on a ratio scale) .
We see the importance of this approach in
the possibility of being able to consistently analyze soft
properties of complex systems that also have characteristics
measured on a ratio scale. Combine vectors, whose elements
are only zeros and ones, obtained by experiments,
simulations or military judgement to an incidence (or
design) matrix denoted by X. Formulate the hard and soft
characteristic relation hypothesis as a general linear
regression model, not of full rank, denoted by the matrix
quantity Y = Xb + e (e indicating the error terms)
.
Analogous to regression on balanced or
unbalanced designs of systems whose component instances are
completely measurable in a ratio scale mathematical
statistical theory delivers sound methods to solve normal
equations of the general linear hypothesis. As Searle in
[31] p 180-224 and others explicitly show, linearly
independent estimable functions exist which allow to explore
the system^ structure under consideration (see for explicit
discussion [ 94 ]) .
We would like to emphasize that some
applications of this methodology are known in military
experiments (e.g. in the ASARS II Study at CDEC [82]) and
studies exist that particularly address this technique to
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military experiments (e.g. [99]). For completeness, we also
would like to point out that the state-of-the-art to obtain
linearly independent estimable functions is "trial and
error". We strongly believe that further research work can
yield other than "trial and error methods".
Regression on dummy variables is one method
to explore more efficiently the impact of soft information
in systems than it is now done in most combat models.
However, since the structure of linearly independent
estimable functions may restrict the interference initially
intended to obtain we depart from this methodology with
respect to the model formulation used to extract wanted
information.
(4) Identifying Soft and/or Hard Properties
In contrast to the questionable approaches
to account for more detail in formulating combat
interactions marked out in the above two examples, we use
now the dummy variable representation of system
characteristics in a slightly different way. Let us view
dummy variables as binary variables or Bernoulli random
variables with the only outcomes zero and one. Thus,
experiments, tests, simulations and representative military
judgements are only asked to identify absence or appearance
of states of a property or of a component of a coherent
system (e.g. absence or appearance of a critical supply
good, a crucial weather condition, an important intelligence
information or an assumed human behaviour) . These state
outcomes of properties (i.e. quantifications of instances of
properties) may either be predicted, observed from
indicators, exactly measured or simulated. In order to
assign the values zero and one consistenly to identified
states we state that functioning of components is the
desired situation and components' failures degrade system's
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worth regardless, whether their appearance or absence is
critical with this regard. Hence, assign one, if a component
fails and zero if it does not.
This procedure allows us to consistently
aggregate soft and hard information. We are able to specify
the level of resolution in accordance with the level of
analysis that we expect to perform via the combat model.
Interdependent combined arms force's elements have been
abstractly categorized as components of coherent systems.
This scheme combined with identified states will serve as
the driving vehicle to start to formulate the Concept of
Estimable Rates to refine estimates for LARC. Since we
persue the idea to view combat elements as components of a
coherent system in more detail later we focus now on
problems that arise, if unigue or unanimous state
identification may be doubted, i.e., if the instance of a
very soft, but combat relevant property is judged
differently by military experts. '
Soft and/or hard information
quantifications, in instances and/or scales respectively,
have to follow exact rules for numerical computations
imposed by the definitions of different measurement scales
(see for a thourough treatment [30], [31], [80], [84] and
[85]). Consider for example the soft property "initiative of
a military leader". How can we get numerically a handle on
this human feature that is claimed to be necessary to
successfully lead troops on a battlefield. Me formulate the
nature of this problem for illustrative purposes very
general and assume that (m) instances of this property are
sufficient to decide that a military leader possesses
initiative.
Cite (n) military experts ( m , n being
integers) and ask them to consider each of the [n(n-1) ]/2
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possible pairs of instances, and within each pair, to split
(divide) one hundred points. For example, if one judge
perceives that instance (x) will be three times more
required than instance (y) , he might allocate seventy-five
points to (x) and twenty-five to (y) . Comrey developed a
method for Absolute Ratio Scaling (see [84]) that produces
least-squares estimates (see [80]) for the ratio scale
values of each instance. The assumption in this "Constant
Sum Method" (see [100]) is
-the choice cf the unit for the scale values is arbitrary,
therefore we choose one such that the mean of the natural
logarithm of the scale values is zero (Note that this is
equivalently as to assume that the error variable of a
linear regression model has mean zero and a finite second
moment, i.e. no specific distributional property for the
error variable must be specified; see e.g. [31] and [80]).
A inonotonic similarity transformation to the least square
estimates of the scale values can yield others on a new
scale zero - one. In order to distinguish between more or
less important instances we introduce a convenient deviding
line on this zero - one scale. The last step in this
procedure only requires us to assign values that lie above
the chosen dividing line (according to our rules, zero; they
are functioning or contributing instances) and to those that
lie below this benchmark (i.e. one).
In a summary, whenever a soft or hard
property causes difficulties with respect to identification
of system states, we apply the very straight-forward
Constant sum Method. Scale values produced by this
technique are put on a zero - one scale and we gain by
introducing a judgementally determined benchmark estimates
(statistically best linear unbiased ones) that deliver scale
values for instances of properties. Their values can be
transformed to the numbers zero and one and are naturally in
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an absolute ratio scale. For these numbers all mathematical
operations are allowed.
c. Cost Effectiveness Evaluation
In a variety of studies relative relations (i.e.
not the individual values of variables under consideration,
but only their ratios) are very useful to gain insight into
very complex problems. As the work of Taylor and Parry in
recent publications [18] and [19] particularly for combat
models shows, the use of LATMW in simple formulations has
been tremendously enriched in this direction.
Along the lines of problems of inconsistencies
in measurement scales, however, is the use of so-called cost
effectiveness ratios, especially when combat model outputs
are combined with costing or budgeting considerations. The
economic impact of the application of these type of ratios
forces us to devote a separate paragraph to the subject as
their general deficiencies are covered by incommensurability
problems of measures in different units.
The recommended procedure to solve cost
effective problems is to use the effectiveness ratio, which
divides the cost of the system by a number which may be
obtained from the models representing its relative
effectiveness and then chooses the system with the smallest
ratio. This methodology can lead to deceptive conclusions,
if numerator and denoraenator are incommensurable by the
nature of their measurements respectively. Costed inputs
are only comparative with costed outputs (see [57]). To
pursue cost effectiveness with the ratio approach, which
might only be assisting in exploring some trends, is only
adequate, if great care is taken in analyzing the process
under examination. This difficulty is explainable by the
48

inherent lack of most of the combat models to permit cost
effective analysis directly with model outputs (see e.g.
[59]). One reason for this is their pure performance
orientation, i.e. some criteria of the MEF are not
satisfied. The main reason lies in the methods commonly
used r but in an unscientific way, to resolve decision
processes in the defense management area. The department of
defense in almost every country may be viewed as the single
enterprise which consumes the most economic resources at the
same time having the least developed cost accounting system
that would allow cost effectiveness analysis. Compare for
example [6] p 365: "Because the costing procedure has not
been stated in an explicit and reproducible manner, the
dialogue between the Secretary of Defense and the Services
will be far less concise".
Military budgeting procedures are different from
industrial costing procedures. Budgeting of public goods, in
general, lacks the counterpart revenue encountered in
financial accounting systems applied in the industry. Yet,
both goods (public and industrial) to be costed out have the
same problem nature in common: to effectively allocate
scarce resources to yield outcomes.
Economic order quantities (EOQ) examined for
cost effective alternative decisions, for example in
industrial Inventory Control Theory (see [96]), cannot be
used directly for expenditure alternatives of public goods.
Foregone revenues expressed as costs of inconvenience that
occur, if one acts against an avoidable prespecified
critical and revenue degrading task are very unlikely to be
easily (if at all) identified as costs for public goods.
We also like to note that the teem "costs"
usually is interchangeably used with expenditures in
connection with public goods. This may lead to confusion, if
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one rearly would mean that expenditures as costs can be
earned by offering goods on a free-trade market.
The idea to apply cost effectiveness control in
small or large scale for military investments dates back to
McNamara. Up to now, this concept has not been fully
implemented at all levels in military cost effectiveness
considerations. In effect, Administrative Science has
invested a lot with this regard. The following statement
however, directs to further needs: "We must have the
capability to rapidly cost out proposed alternative forces
and to compare alternative costing methods" [6] p 367.
Our MEF reguires, therefore, relationships that
are usable for cost effective trade-off analysis. We will
present later some ideas of how differential models can be
utilized more effectively as it is usually done in COEA
studies (see e.g. [57]) when we have established our Concept
of Estimable Rates.
3. Documentat ion and Credibility
As Fig 2 indicates, possibilities for committing
pitfalls in constructing aodels are spread all over the
int erdepandent elements of the MEF imbedded in the Cone of
Abstraction. The two examples given above for pitfalls in
measurement-scale problems sketch the problems and doubts
that may arise, if insufficient documentation for a model is
provided. We appreciate the tremendous effort of man-hours
and costs to produce a suitable documentation for a Theater
Level Combat Model. However, how else can scientific
statements about the modelling approach be tested, as by
allowing to follow them through in a careful documentation.
Furthermore, the scope, the complexity and the importance of
the problems addressed with LATMW demand scientific complete
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verification and valididation. Trade-off alternatives may be
derived with these models that influence the governmental
budgeting procedures and have direct or indirect impact on
other necessary investments in a public interest. Therefore,
the argument sometimes used to excuse insufficient
documentation and revision for credibility: "to save effort
and time" supports, in the author's view, more the fact: "to
risk to waste money" where it could have been avoided.
The requirement of oar MEF (6) , allowance of
verification and validation, implicitly extends to
documentation and proof of credibility. Combat model
builders are therefore obliged not only to claim what their
model can yield, but to explicitly and scientifically prove
this to the model user (see also [70] Summary of Invited
Papers p 17). Again, our MEF requirements (1)-(6) offer the
set of conditions that help to determine whether or not a




III. SPECIFIC MODELLING CONSIDERATIONS
The primary intention of this paper is not to build a
manual for a complex combat model for a NATO scenario
satisfying the established HEP. One purpose, however, is to
analyze shortcomings of current applied modelling techniques
and to provide guidance with basic and new ideas that
improve on the scientific approach to model some specific
aspects required for combined arms actions. We will in the
following discussions, particularly, concentrate on various
features that are imposed by the MEF requirements with
respect to LATMW for a complex theater scenario. Modelling
techniques are derived in detail that allow us to extend and
to adjust relative simple differential combat models to
powerful tools for military cost/effectiveness analysis.
Thus, we study now the simpliest differential combat model
that can be enriched with further detail for any








Figure 3 - THE SQUARE LAW FORMULATION OF LANCHESTER
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A. LATMW AND THE MEF
Our claim that the MEF is an instructive management and
analysis tool to check, whether a modelling approach
satisfies lower bounds to abstract combined arms engagements
or not will be examined by considering heurisrically
Lanchester's original work. Without loss of generality this
type of procedure is also valid, if more detailed LATMW or
other modelling techniques (Wargaming, Simulation) are
inspected with this regard.
The familiar square law (aimed fire) and linear law
(area fire) processes associated with the name
F. W.Lanchester [28] cover concisely with their assumptions
the concept of operations, organization of combat, and
coordinating instructions for opposing forces (compare
formulations and schematical graphical representant ion in
Fig 3 and also detail-ed model assumptions in [47]) .
Essentially a very high abstraction of the information
content of STANAG's 2014 Execution is subsumed in these
mathematical formulations.
Initial conditions of force levels (number of
combattants at the beginning of a battle) describe STANAG's
2014 Situation at the start. Assuming complete information
about the contestant's intentions at any time covers
STANAG's 2014 Command and Signal. Lanchester attrition-rate
coefficients (LARC which are defined to be the rate at which
a single weapon system destroys enemy targets per unit time)
measure performance of individual weapon systems employed
according to STANAG's 2014 Mission. They drive the rate of
change of individual force levels at each time step. Except
for STANAG's 2014 Logistics and Administration, these
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differential equations are first-cut mathematical
formulations of the engagement of two opposing homogeneous
forces without allowing for any detailed and sophisticated
analysis. Whatever academic or philosophical argument may
lead to rejection of analytical models, it cannot be denied
that Lanchester's original work is a point of departure for
building more complex and (hopefully) realistic combat
models.
To exercise LATMW with the aid of a computer is
relatively cheap with respect to costs for computer running
time, even, if these models represent large scale combat in
a very detail (see [20]). The mathematical formulation of
combat processes with a system of differential equations is
highly transparent as opposed to other analytical modelling
approaches. The later are sometimes forced to introduce
shortcomings in their formulations that lead to pitfalls to
a larger extent than one usually presumes.
Differential models play an important and widely
accepted role in Fire Support Analysis (see e.g. [70]
Appendix 4 and [71]) . Recent developments in LATMW consider
different effectiveness criteria for extended linear and
square law equations that allow to analyze more model
detail. They investigate state equations, force ratios,
exchange ratios (see e.g. [18], [19] and [29]) or functional
criteria (see e.g. [48] and [49]) as performance
effectiveness relations. Less is done to resolve consistent
logistical aspects for even these simplest of models.
In order to model modern combined arms actions with
LATMW other than only two homogeneous opposing forces, even
in a combat sector model are necessary. Simple models have
to be extended by heterogeneous force formulations, i.e.
they have to account for all units and branches that fight
battles with modern strategies and tactics. As a result,
55

some additional relationships to account for more combat
elements, the combined arms effort in more detail and
precision, their capability, availability and operational
dependability (reliability) can fully complete all
conditions of (1) and (2) of the MEF using LATMW.
LATMW allow us to focus for an analysis on exchange
ratios* state equations or functional criteria. This
relationships, extended by cost factors, are then quantities
that abstract and relate resource consumptions (inputs) to
yielded battle outcomes (outputs) . If we weight all inputs
with their costs we are then able to analyze by the choice
of different battle outcome criteria the economic impact of
alternative strategies and tactics, i.e. we obtain cost
functions for which either fixed cost alternatives or fixed
effectiveness alternatives may be determined. He rectify
this hypothesis in deriving later an explicit and new
technique that cost effectively relates inputs (economic
resources) and outputs (battle outcome predictions) of LATMW
to transaction tables for an input-output analysis. This
satisfies (3) of the MEF.
Such differential equation combat models must usually be
solved with numerical integration methods (see e.g. [95]),
since in general analytical solutions are not readily
obtainable. Numerical integration methods evaluate the
interdependent changes of all time dependent variables of
the system of differential equations at very small time
steps. Differential equations in general are therefore most
apt to represent steadily changing combat characteristics
and agree with (4) of the required conditions of the MEF.
The influence of human behaviour and/or decisions may be
modeled as a closed-loop decision process or as an open- loop
one. The difference of the two model alternatives lies in
the possibility to express the impact of behavorial and/or
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decision variables corresponding to the choices to model
these in ccmbat processes. Closed-loop modules react
immediately and correctively through feedback relationships
at various critical conditions to the data processing
performed in the main model. Open-loop process models
interfere with the main model after certain benchmarks are
reached that indicate different conditions. Their corrective
function, if not omitted, is in effect with a time lag. The
various decision processes may be mathematically handled in
applying Game theoretic optimization methods to LATMW (see
e.g. [50], [51], [60], [61], [62] and [70]). However, it is
well-realized that limitations to obtain closed from
solutions are imposed by Optimal Control Theory methods. We
are therefore urged to refere to the power of Simulations to
narrow the disadvantage of these methods in obtaining "best"
solutions. Simulations without Game theoretic formulations
in only varying some input parameters to explore sensitive
effects in model outputs of a first-cut sector combat model
satisfy MEF requirements with this regard. In essence (5)
of the sufficient conditions of MEF is met with LATMW.
Differential equation models allow us to define all
independent variables and/or coefficients. The structure of
the system of these equations is relatively transparent with
respect to assumptions made. LATMW are therefore also most
apt to aggregate in their final formulations various data
that are gained from experiments, tests, simulations,
military judgement and experience, and from war data. We
refere at this point to our chapter Quantifying Model Inputs
that will describe a new modelling technique with this
regard. Since we show there that all model inputs are
verifiable and validiable the author sees in these favouring
features with respect to Land Combat Modelling the main
advantage in the use of LATMW. We propose to reinforce
detailed and extended research work that concentrates on
obtaining more qualitative inputs for these models. Hence,
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the last and very crucial modelling requirement (6) of the
MEF can be satisfied with differential models. A fair
amount of characteristics abstracted from complex combat
processes can be subsumed in even relative simple
differential models. We view the sketched approach as the
key to successfully model combat: start from information
comprised in STANAG 2014 and follow the MEF requirements at
every step in the model building phase. Models that satisfy
these specifications and are also free of current
shortcomings of combat modelling are fruitful analysis
tools. Exercising these models can support the defense
management to derive quantitative and qualitative estimates
for alternative decisions regarding their operations under
their control (in Morse's and Kimball's sense).
Let us summarize with respect to a model design:
Hell-studied and detailed sets of differential equations for
LATMW are already available (see for an excellent overview
[29]). Combat Modelers can use them to build a complex
theater level land combat model. These models have only to
be feed by inputs that overcome current pitfalls and
shortcomings in modelling by considering the following
points:
1. Extend capability considerations of combined arms
elements (i.e. not only hardware systems) by
reliability and availability aspects
2. Include, logistics and economic potential's
considerations
3. Formulate more than only one combined arms element
(i.e. represent all branches and forces that contribute
to the combined arms operation under consideration)
4. Allow for cost effective input-output analysis.
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These extensions will yield first-cut models to assist
the analysis of current General Purpose Forces problems.
The lowest resolution combat models in the hierarchy of the
Cone of Abstraction and the MEF (compare figure 2) are
achievable and can stand thorough scientific evaluation and
analysis. Any consistent extention of them has a conceptual
basis towards higher resolutions, typically directed also
towards the needs of future research. To illustrate this
slightly differently, Micro and Macroeconomic Theory and
Application depart from highly aggregated, or low resolution
models without pursueing unpermissible suboptimizat ion to
derive General Eguilibrium Analysis and Optimal Resource
Allocations. Instead of using classical models known in
Micro and Macroeconomic Theory that don't specifically
address combat processes of modern combined arms forces we
apply these concepts (general equilibrium analysis and
optimal resource allocation) with LAIMtf that satisfy all MEF
requirements. They are therefore tailored to assist an
Input-Output Analysis (compare the discussion in the chapter
Cost Effective Decisions with LATMW) . The special
orientation on combat dynamics will provide the military
management with scientific decision aids. Although a
perfect and complete model does not exist, and will never be
achieved, simple and consistent scientific models have
always been powerful supporters for the decision finding
process at very high levels of responsible decision
regarding difficult and complex problems. We again refer to
Tsipis' work, as an excellent example, to model the nuclear
threat sufficiently at a very low level of resolution.
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B. QUANTIFYING MODEL INPUTS
Rather than leaving the above model design extensions as
purely guidelines with respect to model building, we now
derive a new scientific approach that allows us to
substantiate the above claims. Starting with the exact
definition cf our systems effectiveness of combat elements
represented in LATMW, we then consider an abstraction of
state outcomes of components of these systems. He would like
to point out that this approach is applicable for a variety
of systems (as combat elements) that constitute large scale
battles of modern combined arms forces. Finally, we provide
the mathematical development to guantify systems
effectiveness via observable states of system components and
derive our Concept of Estimable Rates.
1 • Effectiveness of Combat Elements
A combat element is any coherent system that
produces a combat activity interdependent in a combined arms
effort utilizing hardware, human operators, and decisions,
and, thereby uses up scarce resources. This definition
arranges combat elements (e.g. in military terms, branches,
as armor, infantry, artillery, engineer, supply, maintenance
and intelligence, described in STANAG 2014) in a more
systematic way for modelling purposes. This will allow us
to resolve the systems' structures and then aggregate their
capabilities, availabilities, and reliabilities by
measurable observations of systems' components. A combat
element operates with its maximum effectiveness if and only
if all its non redundant components are functioning or
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contribute to the overall system effectiveness. We
distinguish only between two states, a functioning state and
a failed state, and apply this dichotomy to each combat
element as well as to each of its components.
The aggregation of combat elements is a coherent
system itself and its effectiveness is completely measurable
by means of the state identifications of their components. A
series or parallel structure of combat elements allows us to
apply mathematical theorems which are suitable for coherent
systems whose states are specified by binary variables (or
Bernoulli or dummy variables) taking on values zero or one,
if functioning or failure is observed respectively.
Fig 4 is a schematical representation of this
formulation. The choice of the series structure function for
combat elements themselves and a series or parallel
structure function for interdependent combat elements will










Figure 4 - COMBAT ELEMENTS AS COHERENT SYSTEMS
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Suppose two forces are engaged. Any side can only
hope to be a victorious candidate if and only if
-the hardware systems are operating, tanks for example
-and the human operators are trained (i.e. know how to
handle the hardware system)
-and the operable hardware system is managed
-and coordinated according the order of the battle (i.e.
operated in an organizational frame through command and
control)
-and the operable and managed and coordinated hardware
system can use up and replace supplies.
On the other hand combined arms effort may be
characterized with a series or a parallel structure.
Sometimes it is necessary to take an objective only with
armor, sometimes artillery and engineers are needed to
support this branch. We like to get answers out of combat
models such as how many combat elements should be employed
in series or in parallel and when? These considerations may
appear to be trivial, but as a matter of fact they are not
and therefore get overlooked in complex combat models (see
our discussion of Performance driven Models, which are
mainly concerned with the physical functioning of hardware
systems)
. Since our approach to formulate combat in models
starts from information presented in STANAG 2014, it should
be noted that in our terminology a combat element is a
coherent system of components whose states may be either
hard or soft information (instances of properties)
representations. Under each scenario and mission type the
following systems' components have to function in series:
-hardware systems (as a part of our overall complex system)
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-human operators, i.e. performance and behaviour (morale
suppression, etc.), the human decision interface, i.e.
doctrine and tactics, command and control
-resource consumption and allocation, i.e. logistics and
economic war potentials
-environmental conditions imposed by scenario and mission,
i.e. for example terrain, weather, day or night.
We use the term system or combat element interchangeably but
with the above meaning.
The effectiveness of a system is concerned with:
1. The ability of the system to perform satisfactorily
when it is called upon to perform (i.e. the system
reliability or operational dependability denoted as
(R))
2. The ability of the system to begin performing its
mission when called upon (i.e. the availability or
operational readiness denoted by (A) )
3. The actual performance measure of the system in terras
of its performance functions and the environment in
which it is performed (i.e. the design adequacy, or
capability or utilization denoted by (C) )
.
LARC obtained with current quantification methods
(Bonder/Barf oot, Clark) are within these considerations as
mostly related to a hardware system's capability to destroy
a target. They assume that system components are one
hundred percent reliable and available (functioning during
the mission time) and are as such only parts to determine
our- system's effectiveness. The proposed extension to
account for more than mere capability of hardware systems
(C) must therefore be manifold. We need a numerical index of
the extent to which a combat element is ready and capable of
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fully performing its assigned mission, i.e. availability
(A) . We further need a numerical index of the extent to
which the performance capability of the system is utilized
during a mission, i.e. the reliability (R) . Both concepts
refer to consistent time dependent functional relationships:
availability usually meaning the ability of the system to
operate at any given point in time when called upon to do
so; reliability for a mission depicting the ability of the
system to operate effectively for a specified
mission-time-period, usually conditional on its being
operable at the start of the period.
The combination of the capability (C) , the
availability (A) and the reliability (R) as the product of
these components yields a combat element's or system's
effectiveness (E) . This is a measure of the extent to which
a system may be expected to achieve a set of specific
mission requirements. This quantity is a function of
capability, reliability and availability in accordance with
the definitions of system's effectiveness in our general
modelling consideration and [66]. A simple
relationship, E = ARC, accomplishes an effectiveness measure
for LATMW using LARC weighted by the operational demand
within a given period when operated under specific
conditions. The weighting factors only have to satisfy
conditions (1)-(6) of the MEF in being empirical or
judgemental time dependent probability estimates of combat
elements combining hard and soft information of systems
components as regards reliability and availability. This
relationship then also includes
- that the systems effectiveness can be measured as the rate
at which a single system achieves its mission (e.g. for
armor to destroy a target)




that the system's effectiveness is a function of the
environment cr conditions under which the system is used.
Note that this functional relationship is in accordance with
one of the earliest writings with respect to systems
effectiveness which still represents one of the clearest and
best descriptions of the subject and one from which most
subsequent descriptions, such as ours, have been derived
[67].
The relationship E = ARC pertains to
reliability and availability estimates for combat elements.
Thus, for coherent systems, even very complex ones, we need
a mathematical and statistical representation to predict
system reliability and availability from either component
failure times or component failures whether the components
operate continously or cyclicly. We consider only component
failures and denote the occurance of a failure by one and
its functioning by zero. Without violating permissible
mathematical operations for measurement scales, the binary
variable modelling of component states asks us only to
specify which component is considered and to observe its
state. Since the dynamic and complex nature of combat
processes over any instance in time is to be modeled, we
account for spontaneous state changes of components due to
mission and combat environment conditions.
After we have explored the detailed structure of a
coherent system, decoupled in components, the appropriate
structure function can be abstracted (for detailed
mathematical treatment see [65], [69] e.g.). We hypothezise
from this abstraction that reliability and availability
probabilities can be derived via any combat modelling
technique chosen (see e.g. [65] p 192-194).
As a more general result for modelling with LATMW
denote the possibility that the system is operated in
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different operational modes (k) and assume that estimates
for
E = A R C
k k k k
can be obtained and that each operational mode is executed a
certain percentage of mission time denoted by p , then
k
E = ^E p
k k k
represents the system's effectiveness for different
operational modes 1 dependence. Specifically, with
> p = 1, any desired extension incorporates into system's
K *
effectiveness the aspects of reliability and availability of
consecutive changing operational modes.
2 • Hardware Sy,st e msx Human I nterface, Combat
Environment, Logis tics Interface
The above proposed modelling extension allows us,
even, if a hardware system is not yet produced in lots, to
utilize available test data for prototypes. Tolerable
reliability and availability lower bounds are specified; why
don't we not use them in order to account for more realism
in the abstraction process to formulate combat in models to
improve on capability quantifications?
For example, consider the combat element the tank.
The Bonder/Barfoot or Clark methodology delivers attrition
rates for the hardware performance, if the system is assumed
100% reliable and available. Already available empirical
life testing data from the institutionalized United States
Government Information Data Exchange Program (GIDEP)
delivers hardware intrinsic reliability and availability
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estimates (see for numerical computing guidance [64], [65],
[72], [73] and [74]). The importance of these weighting
factors with respect to Life-Cycle-Costs has been fully
realized and the need to maximize reliability and
availability, or minimize failure rates, found expression in
the Reliability Improvement Warranty (RIW) Concept of the US
Army (see e.g. [ 16 ] p 493).
By utilizing available data, which are obtained by
observing and counting the appearance of component states
(go-no-go data), we have refined the LARC. It should be
noted that a trade-off analysis to answer the question: To
buy more less-reliable and available or less more-reliable
and available hardware systems can be assessed cost
effectively with these extended formulations.
"Rather than aggregate effects, VRI chose to
include, and dynamically keep track of, explicit
representation of force elements, environment and processes
in terms of measurable physical and behavioral variables"
[70] Appendix 4 p 32. This statement alludes to the
necessity to include more than only hardware performance
oriented quantifications in LATMW. However, we quantify
combat environment and behavioral variables, for example,
with a more appropriate method that yields sound numerical
inputs into analytical models. Our component state
quantification doesn't force us to measure (How? What are
the units and origins for their measurement scales?)
behavioral variables. We would probably have to have to
aggregate inconsistently different measurement scales and to
commit pitfalls. Our behavorial variables, as components,
need only be represented as states at different levels and
either function or fail. In order to model the human
interface, we only ask, for example: Is the necessary
command to fire given in time or not? Is the human operator
capable enough to convert this command into an action or
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not? Is the suppression effect so high that the human
operator didn't react as he should have? Is the morale in
the unit so depressive that the soldier departs from his
expected behaviour? etc. This appioach leaves enough room
to refine human interface at any degree of high resolution
(compare our possible extension in applying the Constant Sum
Method)
.
We consistently specify also environment conditions
by binary state outcomes and count the appearance of
different component states over a mission. Did fog (to be
represented at different levels) reduce visibility? Did
sunlight (represented at different levels) diminish the
capability to acguire a target? Did snowfall (represented
at different levels) reduce traf f icability? Did night
(represented at different levels) interphere the possibility
to give commands with visual aids? etc.
For logistics interface, as our last important
component, we give an explicit treatment with respect to
modelling implications in the chapter: Modelling Example to
gain Estimable Rates. This will explicitly show the general
power of the classification of component states. For a
brief demonstration now we only indicate that for each
logistics' support there are observable states paraphrased




The unique representation of each combat element as
a coherent system with at least four independent very highly








Any further refinement of its component structure and its
associated structure function offer modelling possibilities
to any wanted detail of resolution. Structure dependence or
redundant subcomponents can be modeled. Once the components'
structure function (as aggregated elements themselves) are
known (and this will be the most critical part to identify)
their state outcomes, either directly observable or easily
represented in digital computers for a simulation, deliver
the state outcomes one or zero at snapshot instances of a
battle. We found a natural way to estimate the
interdependent functioning conditions of a complex and
coherent system such as our defined combat elements.
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3 . From Bina ry_ Number s to E stimab le Rates
Component state outcomes, the failure indicated with
one (for convenient estimation of failure rates) , the
functioning with zero, allows us by the repetitive nature of
their observations during an ongoing battle, to count the
number of observed states and estimate the fraction of the
failure occurance of states with (q) . At this point it will
become very obvious why we depart from current modelling
techniques and claim that our approach quantifies STANAG
2014 information requirements at the same time leeting all
conditions imposed by tha MEF.
The idea to express the contribution of states of
each component with respect to the system's overall worth is
to measure how many times (estimated in % by p (i) and q (i) )
for each single component or for a component instance (i)
,
is a prespecified expected demand (the expected overall
behaviour of the combat element that model builder should be
told) met in time or not? It is required to obtain the
percentages for each time step that the modeled component
(or instance) takes on values zero (fulfilled demand) or one
(failed to match the demand) with p(i) + q (i) = 1. We can
utilize, if further design specifications are implemented,
VECTOR-II that claims to keep track of explicit
representation of our components or DYNTACS or field
experiments of CDEC or military judgement (map exercises,
wargames, questionnaires) .
We provide now the model that conveniently converts
binary numbers into systems effectiveness* degrading rates.
Let the total number of specified, independent, and non
redundant demands (i) that a component satisfies a
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functioning state be k r then
"ff(i-g(i))
i
represents the probability of satisfaction of k components
or component levels in time. Assume that q (i) « 1,
otherwise q(i) -> 1 says that components would have failed
most of the time and this would lead to mortality of the
system. View this also as another complimentary
interpretation of the stopping rule requirements for state
variables to be > in L&THi formulations in general.
An appropriate approximation yields exp (-r) , where




since q(i) « 1
yields g(j) exp(-r).
Considering that only one demand is not satisfied, i.e.
either j-th or others, extends our derivation to
zZ[q(i)/o-q(i)) fJTo-^ 1 ))
i i
=T!g (i) exp (-r)
= r exp (-r) .
Applying the idea that each (logical and) of the specific




which becomes, by introducing a counting variable X = N (t) a




P(X<n) =21[ exP(" r ) r ]/ x! -
x
If a counting variable N (t) is distributed Poisson
with rate (parameter) r, which is estimable with q(i) 's
through the extent at which each specific demand for a
mission is satisfied, then the time T until N (t) countings
of demand and reaction mismatches have occured is
distributed Exponential with the mean 1/r* w © give a
heuristic proof of this result, that provides direction for
the number of replications for simulation or the sample size
for test plans or simulation replications to obtain
empirical system reliability and availability estimates (not
only in the common performance oriented sense) and their use
in LATMW modelling with refinable LARC.
Each mission specific demand i of a combat element
has a distribution F (i) (only this general property is
sufficient, although we can identify these distributions
explicitly as Bernoulli distributions with parameters p (i) ,
for all i viewed as independent but necessary variables of
the total system) . The number of events (identified states)
per demand i counted over a time period constitute, in the
long run (mathematically as time (t) goes to infinity) , a
stationary Renewal Process. For a battle the counting
process is repetitive and stationary for similar combat
situations arising over days, which we like to assess with
differential models. Knowledge of the Central Limit Theorem
of Renewal Theory tells us that superimposed stationary
renewal processes constitute a Poisson process (see [64],
[92]) .
Mathematically we can establish the same result
slightly differently, but it is also instructive for a
coherent system decoupled into many components. In 1837,
Poisson considered the problem of n Bernoulli trials, but
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with the probability varying at each trial (see e.g. [80] p
214) . Instead of approximating the Poisson parameter r with
np (n = sample size, p = fraction defective, to stick with
the most widely used notation) , he approximated r
with p (i) for all n different outcomes of p (i) and showed
that both formulations can be approximated by the Poisson
distribution (see e.g. explicit treatment in [33], [80] and
[86]). Since the same formulation holds in modelling
component states, we can easily apply the whole spectrum of
methods to obtain Sampling Plans for Attributes Data used in
Quality Control for hardware systems, i.e. determine the
number of replications for simulations or the sample size
for operational tests (see [86]) which find ready
application in the military community (see MIL STDs 105 D,
209, 213, 238), if, in fact, the counting variables
constitute a stationary Renewal Process and the Central
Limit Theorem of Renewal Theory holds.
** • The_ Final Concept of Estimable Rates
The approach to represent components of combat
elements as binary variables and to observe their state
outcomes is independent of the length of time for which the
above counting procedure for events is applied. In
mathematical terms, if the Central Limit Theorem of Renewal
Theory doesn't hold and we are forced to assess short time
intervals of battle processes (e.g. at each time step the
numerical integration results for differential equations of
LATMW are updated) then we can still use the basic modelling
idea, but with a slightly different Renewal theoretic
consideration. Let us establish the final result of our
modelling technique that is applicable to consistently
quantify any soft and/or hard information extracted from
coherent systems. The results will also hold without loss of
generality and are independent with respect to the length of
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time for which the effectiveness of dynamic systems (similar
to those we have defined) is to be assessed.
We define reliability as the ability of a system to
perform satisfactorily when it is called upon to perform.
Using Reliability Theory's terminology, the failure rate or
the hazard function (we use also the teem hazard
interchangeably) is defined as the rate at which a system
dies given it is alive. This is a sufficient and consistent
characterization of systems 1 changing effectiveness over a
period of time in a combat environment. Reliability
theoretic considerations are subclasses of Renewal theoretic
considerations (see [64], [65]) with a change of
interpretation of the random variables under consideration.
Reliability Theory is mainly concerned with distributional
properties of life lengths of systems (failure times, number
of failures) , Renewal Theory formulates in general terms
number of equal events occuring as system attributes
(renewal times, number of renewals - 'our renewals are
occurances of system's components failures). Note that the
hazard function uniquely defines the corresponding
probability distribution, i.e.
4
f(t) = z(t) exp (-fz(s) ds)
e
(compare e.g. [74] p 226 - 227), where f(t) denotes the
distribution and z (t) the hazard. If the reliability R(t)
uniquely defines the expected value of the random process,
i.e.
E(T) =JR(t) dt (compare also [74]),
e
and the hazard uniquely determines the reliability, i.e.
t
R(t) = exp (-/z (s) ds) (see also [74]),
o
then the relationship between the epochs as the sum of (n)
renewal times T (denoted as (T (n) ) and the counting variable
N as the number of (n) occurances of renewals in time (t)
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(denoted as N (t) ) holds:
(N(t) < n) = (T(n) > t) (see e. g. [78] p 5).
This relationship allows as to establish our general result:
The last expression above defines the distributional
property of the renewal process, i.e. uniquely relates the
sum of the renewal times T [T(n) ] to the number of
occurances of renewals N [ N (t) ]. The application of our
modelling technique allows us to obtain estimates for these
expressions. The quantity of considerable interest in
modelling of any renewal process is the renewal function,
i.e. the expected value of the number of renewals in time
(t) and is defined as M(t) = E[ N (t) ]. Therefore, we can use
our estimates (in utilizing any combat modelling technique
that is sufficient to represent our defined complex and
dynamic combat systems) in order to obtain values for M (t) .
The renewal intensity, denoted by m(t), is defined as the
derivative of M(t) for which a last computation yields the
final numerical estimates (for our modelling interest) to
refine the LARC. In tying Reliability theoretic and Renewal
theoretic results together, we observe that the renewal
intensity is equivalent to the hazard function (the rate at
which a systems dies given it is alive) . Using the notation
introduced earlier, we can compute our hazards, i.e.
m(t)=z(t) which contribute to the finally wanted reliability
and availability weightings. Note, as time (t) goes to
infinity the hazard z (t) (or m (t) ) approaches to (r) , the
parameter of a homogeneous Poisson process. (For
computational assistance to obtain system hazards with our
modelling technique compare the methods described to
approximate Renewal functions e.g. in [78] p. 28-37).
The power of this modelling approach is to be seen
in the consistency and exactness to aggregate any soft
and/or hard information that describe the degrading effects
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(failure rates) of dynamic systems. Furthermore, the
contribution of all system components with respect to the
overall worth (effectiveness) of combat systems can be
assessed with one modelling technique. This approach for
modelling systems effectiveness departs from
state-of-the-art models (e.g. from DYNTACS or VECTOR- II) in
many ways:
First, we don't intend to use less detailed data to describe
a complex problem. The differences lie in the method to
implement this information in existing formulations of
combat models. Reliability and availability considerations
provide a theoretically sound and, as we will show
explicitly, a handy way, even for large scale theater level
models, to extend capability or performance measures of
systems and their effectiveness analysis.
Secondly, we aren't forced to use inconsistent data
processing modules to degrade state variables "somewhat".
Distributions for random number generators to "adjust"
battle outcomes in models that utilize random variates by
oversimplifying combat abstraction in assuming "uniform or
normal distributions" can also be avoided (see a detailed
discussion with this regard for DYNTACS in [91]). Instead,
we are able to combine soft and hard information
characterizing - hardware systems - human interface
resource consumption and allocation, and -combat anvironment
conditions. Free of committing any pitfalls, we relate this
extracted and combined information to the overall system
under consideration with an analytical functional
relationship.
Third, we are able to explicitly state what conditions of
STANAG 2014 information is modeled and which M3F
requirements are met.
Fourth, we can utilize any modelling technique (either War
Gaming, Simulation, or Analytical Models) and are able to
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incorporate as much as possible from results of RDT&E, field
experiments and military judgement to verify and validate
the results. Me give sufficient indications for sample
sizes or number of replications. This information can
easily be combined with LATMW.
Fifth, we direct to further research needs in order to
explore the main elements and components which drive combat
outcomes.
Sixth, we are able to assess, cost effectively, economic
resources.
Finally, we are able to enrich a low resolution model to any
degree of higher resolution without committing inconsistent
aggregation.
Let us summarize, in pragmatic modelling design
terms, given a detailed binary representation of systems
components, we are able to obtain the system hazards for
homogeneous or inhomogeneous Poisson processes (see e.g.
[87] p 129 - 133) and can therefore uniquely determine the
combat elements 1 reliability and availability. Since the
derived methods are applicable to any complex systems
operating for any mission time and the key relationship of
interest to assess combat more isomorphic is the systems'
hazard we name this approach Concept of Estimable Rates.
We would like to point out that because of the
possibility to explore the system's hazard or the renewal
intensity the availability A (t) is also easily obtainable
(see [78] p 19 - 21 or [65] p 190 - 201) and Availabilty
theoretic results (see [65] for more background information)
can be established either for short-time or for long-time
considerations.
The Concept of Estimable Rates is therefore an
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application of Renewal theoretic considerations whose
estimable hazards can be obtained in a consistent scientific
way that meets all requirements of the MEF. It allows us to
model any wanted detail of soft and/or hard information from
STANAG 2014 (Note an alternative theoretical sound approach
to reduce this "any wanted detail" to the most driving
subcomponents of components of combat element would be by
the regression on dummy variables with its not yet resolved
limitations of the state-of-the-art)
.
C. ESTIMABLE RATES AND REFINED LARC QUANTIFICATIONS
For simplicity, let us now conider some estimable rate
formulations in LATMW with constant LARC, even our general
result would us not restrict to this at all, i.e. we assume
that one has obtained estimates for LARC and for their
reliability and availability weightings '(homogeneous Poisson
processes) that deliver constant refined LARC. The
abstraction of each combat element's structure as a coherent
system with at least four independent components in series
requires at least four hazards for the reliabilities which
degrade system capability, the LARC denoted by C. By the
choice of a proper missioa time or battle stopping rule and
the mission hazards, the mission reliability of the system
becomes
R = exp[-(z +z +z +z ) ] = R R R R .12 3 4-1234
The expected proportion of time the system (or force or
combat element) is operating during the mission time
(availability, A) is defined by
A. = (1/z.)/(1/(z.+z..))
,
ID i i 13
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where i corresponds to the mean functioning time (reciprocal
of the hazard) and j corresponds to the mean repair or
recovery time of the system's components 1,...,4. The total
degrading of the LARC estimates due to hardware's, human
interface's, logistics' and environment's reliabilities and
availabilities is aggregated in
E=RA RA RA RA C.
1 11 2 22 3 33 4 44
The solely performance oriented LARC, C, can be refined by
means of observations, simulations and experimentation in a
scientifical thorough way.
It should be noted that the mean repair or recovery time
of a system's component usually is not deducible from
homogeneous or inhomogeneous Poisson processes. Hardware
systems' repair times are most likely to follow lognormal
distributions and nomographs exist which allow us to convert
distribution parameters into the corresponding arithmetic
means, which are used in the A (see for explicit treatment
ij
[89]) . Even, if the hazards follow Poisson processes and
the repair or recovery times are generally distributed,
bounds on the availabilty function are obtainable, which can
serve as appropriate approximations, not solely based on
unvalidated judgements or inconsistencies which might be
committed in modelling complex systems (see for a general
treatment [88 ]) .
For each reliability - availability pair of a single
component some extended formulations are helpful for
modelling purposes.
Define as mission reliability (R ) the probability that
m





Define the operational maintainability of the system
(M ) as the probability that, when a failure occurs, it will
o
be repaired in a time not exceeding the allowable downtime
(t ) , then the effectiveness (E) is
2
E = C A D, where
D = (E +(1-H ) M ) ) .
m mo
Define the fraction of mission time that a system's
component can be down without detection as (p ) , then the
dwd
availability can be refined by
A = p R + (1-p ) A
dwd dwd ij
These formulations already refine LARC to such an extent
that critical combat situations can be successfully modeled.
The impact of wrong tactical decisions can be expressed by
the mismatch of the observed state from desired state (in
our modelling technique the binary number 1 ) . For the
component "human behaviour" we wish to get estimates of how
long the allowable "down time", i.e. the time to correct the
wrong decision, should be, in order to repair this failure.
In the second modelling refinement we have for this problem
a possibility to estimate the fraction of time we could
operate without detecting this failure and at the same time
not being completely maneuvered in a disadvantage, because
component failures weaken system's capabilities.
Finally, estimable rates are extendible to any degree of
resolution, since the hazards used in the reliability and
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availability formulations can be gained by convolution of
random processes, and in the Poisson case the reproductive
property of a Poisson process yields a Poisson process [74]
p 218-219. Therefore, with very simplified formulations of
LATMW, such as with refined constant LARC, we gain insight
into the impact of components with respect to their
effectiveness in complex battles. Model building is now not
primarily a question of how to incorporate these problems,
but only a matter of how to efficiently manage huge amounts
of information at different levels. Given the system's
component structure function we found a conceptual design to
adjust existing models to MEF requirements without
committing common pitfalls, especially, Performance
Orientation and Measurement Scale Mixes.
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D. MODELLING EXAMPLE TO GAIN ESTIMABLE RATES
1 • Objective and Wort h of L ogist ics
Logistics' nature is to provide supply and
maintenance of man and materiel over the length of a ground
war by steadily executing the functions
1. assembling
2. stockpiling





in order to meet support requirements generated by the
troops on the battle-field. These inherent components of
logistics have to operate in series and demand specific
manpower strengths, organizational forms and management
skills, hardware capabilities and resources to be operable
in changing environments over the course of a battle. Thus,
logistics 1 objective can be defined as the optimal managing
of man and equipment to match supply and demand timed




2 . Performan ce Description of Supply in Ma teriel
Classes and Catego ries
Supply goods are devided accordingly into two
categories, both covering all their variety in amount and
tonnage.
Materiel classes:
-goods used up in large amounts:
AMMO, POL, food, water
-interchangeable goods (defect for working)
-goods used up in small amounts,
spare parts, new system's parts
and new systems
(i.e. stockpiling and transportation criterion
for supply units)
Materiel categories:
This is a categorization of materiel according to
amount and importance with which it is used by specific
weapon systems or combat elements (e.g. infantry, armored
infantry, armor, artillery, engineer) for their military
missions. It indicates primarily for managers allowance and
priority of the demands of materiel.
In essence, thousands of different goods that supply
units deal with are manageable by characteristica that are
aids for ordering and identifying. Supply units transport
materiel from superior supply units on predetermined routes
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(no interference with other strategic or tactical movements)
to their storage location (abstraction by pipeline systems
or networks). supply units react according to priority
rules given by superior command at each individual demand
and signal to the customer the earliest time of availability
of this demand. Supply elements at each command level
distribute them thereafter to the final user or consumer.
Supply goods can be demanded, if supply levels reach a
certain benchmark or a priority is announced by a command.
3 • Performanc e Descrip_t ion of Maintenance
Highly technical weapon systems which tremendously
increase life-cycle-costs (see for definition [35], [36])
are worth being saved if damage occured for which repair is
very promising. Therefore, maintenance units concentrate
on, in addition to repair failures caused by aging or usage,
systems damaged by enemy activities. Maintenance facilities
have to be placed according to prespecified priority rules
at locations where no interference with other combat
activities is expected. These descriptions of the main
functions of logistics allow guantitative measures of
performance at each level of command.
4 • Perf ormance Quantification
Commonly used performance measures for logistics
are:
-number of goods stored per materiel class and category
-number of tons transported per materiel class and category
per km
-number of items delivered with and without delay per
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materiel class and category, both specified in time
intervals
-number of alternative items delivered, if shortage occured,
per materiel class and category
-number of weapon systems saved per combat element and/or
rime
-number of repairs or repair time intervals for failures
caused by aging or usage, per combat element
-number of damaged weapon systems saved during a combat
action
-number of enemy damages repaired per weapon system and time
-number of logistics activities degraded by enemy
activities, mainly interdiction.
Only some MOPs of logistics (supply and maintenance)
have been listed and they indicate the kind of performance
descriptions widely used in combat models, as well as in the
military community. However, the unresolved guestion is,
what conclusions do these lists of numbers allow us to draw
with respect to logistics effectiveness and their impact to
combat elements? Are tons transported and number of weapon
systems repaired sufficient quantifications to formulate
directly that a tank can fight better than his target? The
answer is no. These are only necessarey quantifications. Two
more logical steps are needed to assess logistics* impact:
-consistent conversion of MOPs to quantities expressing
logistics' overall system effectiveness (MOEs)
-relation of logistics' HOEs to system performance and then




5 • Effectiveness an I its Relation to S ystems
Given these performance measures, we are Looking for
numeric expressions that indicate how logistics, as a
complex single component, is able to match supply and
demand. More specifically, we need quantifications of the
states of the logistics components for each time step of a
battle that measure logistics effectiveness and subsume:
-deliver each individual supply item that has been demanded
by a military consumer in time
-save each damaged weapon system that can be repaired in
time
-repair and overhaul damaged weapon systems in time
-before the start of a new mission
-for continuing military operations
-during recovery in a pause of action.
The degree of accomplishment of these tasks thereby
indicating the degrading or nondegrading effects of
logistics with respect to a combat element's effectiveness
imbedded in strategic and tactical missions and scenarios.
The representation of the flow of materiel (i.e. the
connection of all components that belong to a logistics
system) are easily handled with networks in a digital
computer routine. Optimization" algorithms for the resource
allocations exist too (see [83]). Reactions of logistical
performance to needs generated by combat elements can be
simulated and logistics' effect in combat is consistent
represented. More critical and important is the problem of
how to use the information generated most aptly and
consistently by these powerfull means.
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DYNTACS, for example distinguishes between
non-destructive, firepower, mobility, mobility and
firepower, and total kills of weapon systems. Are these not
natural demand generators for logistics maintenance
services? Damage assessment models exist which are then able
to deliver very detailed data (see [90],[16] Volume 1 p
401) . VECTOR - II keeps track of combat elements' locations
on a digitized map for a theater level battle and
traff icability parameters and movement characteristics can
generate, with corresponding rates of weapon system's
advance, POL requirements. The expected number of AMMO
rounds, needed to kill a target extracted from LARC
computations deliver the AMMO consumption data by type and
weapon system.
Instead of only computing totals of tons required,
the number of different supply items needed and the amount
of maintenance services asked for, and comparing those
relatively with the equivalent total amounts that could be
served, we dissolve this aggregation and count the number of
individual mismatches of requested demands and executed
supplies, categorized for single combat elements and ordered
by critical mission times. In addition to the flow of
services through the logistics network, this state
representation provides a natural way to estimate the
fraction (i.e.g(i)'s) of logistics' component failures
within a time frame. The corresponding hazards are
computable as time dependent functions. The rsproductive
property of homogeneous Poisson Processes and convolutions
of inhomogeneous ones establish a logistics' overall hazard,
if different level of resolutions (i.e. commands) are
aggregated. Reliability and availability probabilities
which degrade the combat element's capability, the LARC, are
computable in a consistent and scientificly thorough way.
Combat is dynamic and spontaneous. Therefore, all
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time dependent changes of system effectiveness caused by
system's component failures can only be modeled with time
dependent parameters. We need formulations of system
effectiveness in LATMW that are immediately sensitive to
these changing conditions over time and not highly
aggregated tactical decision rules. The later are most
likely to be implemented in models at an inconsistent level
of resolution and, moreover, in a time lag. Since logistics
components operate continiously it is indispensable for a
differential model, such as VECTOR-II, to ask, at the same
time as other possible input parameter for example, target
acquisition times, times of flight of a projectile dependent
on range etc. are updated to adjust LARC accordingly to all
changing combat environment conditions. In our particular
modelling example we have to ask how reliable and available
are logistics components to accomplish their mission.
The Concept of Estimable Rates offers a unique and
consistent way to estimate systems' components reliabilities
and availabilities. Adjustment of existing models to this
modelling technique, and their extension by similar
quantifications of human interface and environment
conditions, guarantee refinement of the assessment of combat
dynamics via differential models, simulations, and wargames.
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E. LOGISTICS AND LIMITED RESOURCES
»e found in reviewing existing land combat models that
formulations of logistics problems don't satisfactorily
address the evaluation of logistics's worth and objective.
One assumption often made in logistics considerations is:
"resources are assumed to be available in unlimited
amounts". Marshal SoJcolovskii * s argument, based on Lenin and
Engels: "Military power is derived from a nation's economic
status" [52], is simultaneously disregarded, as is the fact
that each cost effective analysis has to trade-off between
scarce or limited resources.
In LATMW, we have to consider possible replacements of
combat elements' resources. The consumption of combat
elements' assets is mostly formulated with replacement rates
(rate at which a demanded supply [ "of any kind" ] must be
replaced per unit time) . This may be a first-cut indication
of how many different and/or equal goods must be stored. The
more decisive question however, is, are production
capabilities of an industry in the position to produce and
deliver these requests in time. For simplicity, and to avoid
model complications (but not infeasible ones) it is assumed
that "resources are unlimited", in other words fighting
forces can always get their predicted consumption
replacements. How important it is to analyze, whether
reguested supplies are available or not (and not only to
express the amounts in which they would be needed) has again
become appearent in a recent conventional conflict, namely
in the ARAB - ISRAELI War (1973). Israeli armored units
couldn't fight and expand some of their advantages in the
first days of the war because they have been out of AMMO and
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POL. Only the use of classified references would allow us
to persue this problem to the very detail. We can stress our
point in this context without doing this and observe that
the "unlimited resources" assumption in a theater level
scenario model never does address real logistical
consideration. The coordinating of production and
consumption, the possible distribution and the delivery in
time are the main logistical aspects that should be modeled
with regard logistics and supply. We like to get answers
like, why, and how "logistics influences all battles and
decides most of them" (to quote General Eisenhower's
statement again) . Urgently needed improvements of this
subject in combat modelling have also been expressed, for
example, in [53] and [54].
Simple LATMW with time dependent replacement rates
formulations (see e.g. [18] p 527) extended by reliability
and availability weightings (estimable with our Concept of
Estimable Rates) can easily be utilized for the analysis of
logistics and economic impacts of battles. For our coherent
system, to model this, production plants are components,
transportation networks are components, supply dumps are
components, etc. . Their functioning or failure determines
the percentage values that degrade the amount of predicted
replacement rates. Such guantif ications are more suitable to
model logistical aspects. In order to assess their economic
impact we have to cost out our coherent system that models
this phenomena. Hoffenberg's and Leontief's work of the
early Sixties: "The Economic Effects of Disarmament" [93]
provides (seen from the analysis method applied) with a
different interpretation (what Economic Effects does
Armament have) an analysis tool (see our discussion
Input-Output Analysis) that could help to answer these
important questions. In asking for more detailed modelling
of logistics' worth and objective one has also to include in
LATMW Air War Strategies that enhance or weaken ground
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combat forces activities. If an opponent concentrates on
massive interdiction, Ground Combat efforts can be paralyzed
in only causing heavy damages to logistics systems or
industrial plants.
F. HETEROGENEOUS FORCES AND SUPPORTING WEAPON SYSTEMS
Heterogeneous force formulations are successfully
implemented in models, as [44], [58], [59], [63] and [93]
for example. This refined modelling approach asks for far
more inputs (LARC) as homogeneous force formulations do.
Without going into too much detail of this powerful
modelling technigue (allows to formulate less aggregated
coherent systems as combat elements) of combined arms
forces, we have to direct a warning to avoid pitfalls and
shortcomings (see Measurement-Scale Problems) that might
occur in the attempt to obtain "pretty refined" LARC
estimates (e.g. to express suppression) as inputs for these
models. Heterogeneous forces are not only combat units
equipped with different capable weapon systems, but also
combat units composed of various components of branches.
Heterogeneous forces already occur, if a tactical or
strategic commander transfers his focal point from one
combat unit to another by changing the general branch
composition cf a brigade, division, or corps. We are fully
aware of the complexity of problems that may arise by the
trend to model each possible battle order. For first-cut
LATMW, this complexity problem may roughly be resolved with
the tendency: "less and good is more valuable than much and
worse". In considering only homogeneous forces of one type
for combat assessment, as a start to gain insight into
combat dynamics, one should, however, at least consider also
homogeneous air forces. Their impact with respect to
logistical considerations and FEBA movement (Forward Edge of
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the Battle Area) for example, are essential in any General
Purpose Forces combat outcome. Some simple LATMW
formulations allow to determine optimal strategies for air
allocation (see [60], [61], [62]). For more complex
differential equation models analytical solutions that
determine the optimal strategies are mathematically
intractible. Simulations that replace an optimal solution
algorithm by varying input parameters and observing the
corresponding battle outcomes may then serve as a welcome
surrogate, especially, since LATMW for theater level sector
models are very cheap with respect to computer running time.
G. COST EFFECTIVE DECISIONS WITH LATMW
Let us remind the reader that one reason to build combat
models is that the Defense Management looks for assistance
in deriving cost alternative decisions for Ground Combat
Forces problems. Therefore, we have to include in Modelling
Considerations for LATMW some aspects that show how we are
able to direct with these models and in using our refined
LARC formulations (with reliability and availability
weightings) to analyze the impact of land war objectives
with respect to economic potentials. We discuss now how
Input-Output models can be applied to military problems in
general. Next, we concentrate on obtaining lower bounds for
Force Postures and Commodity Levels. Finally, we derive
quantifications (obtainable with our refined LARC) for these
and for the Net-output vector elements (the measures of
effectiveness [MOEs] for the destructive capability of the
overall system, for example an armored division) as model
inputs weighted by their costs.
93

1 • Input - Qutgut Analysis
Leontief's Input-Output model [5] has oeen extended
to the Program Planning Budgeting System (PPBS) , under the
LAIRD/PACKARD FISCAL CONSTRAINTS [6] in order to help the
resource analysis community meet the challenges posed by the
tight defense budgets of the future in examining the
analytical resources which are available to us today.
Familiarity with this linear model reveals (for detailed
information see [5], [6]) that the difficulty for a low and
high resolution consistent costing approach in Defense
Planning fcr General Purpose Forces lies not in the
complexity and infeasibility of obtaining meaningful
numerical solutions. The problem is how to adequately
quantify Commodities produced by Services, or Mission Direct
and Support Categories. How are for example, Program
Elements of the Five Year Defense Planning (FYDP) programs
quantified with effectiveness descriptors? Using the
terminology introduced in [6], Force Postures quantify the
output of Force Program Elements and Commodity Levels
measure the output of the Support Program Elements. Now,
admittedly, it is not always easy to identify and
numerically abstract Force Postures and Commodity Levels
(see [6] p 376) . The worth of the analysis is highly
determined by the choice of MOEs of Services or their
Program Elements.
The resource analysis and the combat modelling
community are confronted with the same problem. In context
with our MEF (2) , abstraction and numerical representation
of MOPs and their relation to MOEs, both groups try to
address these questions, the first is more concerned with
cost aspects, the later with strategies and tactics. The
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MEF guides to derive consistent and sufficient abstractions
of combined arms effort. LATMW, oriented on this, may then
serve as producers of Service oriented MOEs. We have shown
(in our Modelling Example to Gain Estimable Rates) that for
logistical assessments tons transported in km, number of
items stockpiled and distributed, number of weapon and/or
hardware systems repaired are no proper choices, to be
weighted with costs, as inputs for transaction tables. These
are no adequate measures of effectiveness of a branch, since
they don't express the overall system's worth and objective.
However, in military costing procedures almost every
so-called effectiveness quantification has only the
character to be a measure of performance. Representative
examples are: intelligence activities in thousands of
man-hours, command and control activities in man-hours, ship
steaming-hours in thousands, each per year and associated
with their costs.
An input-output model Combines the total resource
budget, or the appropriation vector (W) with the indirect
and direct resource requirements. The direct input matrix
(R) and the net-output vector (Y) are related to the cots
(W) by the following quantity W = R Y. Addition of the
elements of the vectors, the left and right hand side,
connects the total budget spent to the net-output elements
weighted by the sum of their primary input matrix elements
(which have also the dimension: costs)
.
Consider only Y as the ARMY net-output, Y as the
1 2
NAVY net-output, Y as the AIR FORCE net-output. The change
of total dollars spent per unit net-output can be obtained
by taking the partial derivatives with respect to the
net-output vector elements. The total differential of the
above expression yields the marginal rates of technical
substitution (see for further detail [3], [4]), because the
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initial set-up of the input-output table constitutes an
arrangement of production functions whose factors are in
terms of currency values and the relationship W = R Y
converts these into cost functions. It should be noted that
"costs" in these formulations are merely currency
expenditures of a budget and not costs defined in
Micro/Macroeconomic Theory (e.g. life-cycle-costs)
.
Since the resource analysis and the combat modelling
community are both challanged to assist in the cost
effective mastering of General Purpose Forces problems, we
propose to use the effectiveness quantifications of LATMW as
well as in the Input-Output models. Their common level of
resolution is guaranteed and with respect to a desired
analysis one common basis is established. We are able to
assess systems effectiveness criteria that drive battle
outcomes in LATMW and the resource allocations that went
into these quantifications.
Conceptually this methodology offers a consistent
and sufficient linkage between Force Postures converted into
direct costs and Commodity Levels (as support costs) and the
net-output vector (i.e. the destructive capabilities of our
systems or ccmbat elements) . We are able to do this because
the application of our MEF requirements for combat models
directs us in an unambiguous and reproducible manner to
overcome the design inadequacies of many combat models with
this regard. Essentially Tsipis' work to analyse the
nuclear threat found a directive for a low resolution
partner to consistently assess General-Purpose Forces role
connected to the economic impact.
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2 . Lowe r Bounds for Force Postures and Commod itx Levels
We stated earlier that the work of Taylor and Parry
has tremendously enriched cost effectiveness considerations
using simple models of L&IMW. The importance of this remark
will now beccme obvious.
Consider the formulation of a combat element as a
complex system that is only functioning if and only if all
components are functioning. What performance characteristic,
for example for armor, as a complex system, allows us at
least to fulfill specified missions? Refined constant LARC
with reliability and availability weightings may serve as
indicators for this. We restate briefly their basic results,
applicable also for time dependent LARC (see for detail
[19])
-local conditions for force superiority may be based on
comparing the force ratio with the instantaneous
force-change ratio (both expressed as friendly to enemy with
two force level variables)
-a side is winning "instantaneously" when the force ratio
exceeds the differential casualty-exchange ratio if no
replacements and withdrawals are introduced
-supporting fires not subject to attrition are egually
effective; i.e. they cancel out, so that the battle's
outcome, although accelerated, is the same as though they
were not present (for combat between two homogeneous
forces)
.
Realizing that only refined LARC's and state
variables (force levels) are involved, enables us to obtain
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lower bounds on LARC and state variables which always ensure
definite predictions of battle outcomes. If we use the same
lower bounds on refined LARC and state variables and extract
from these costed effectiveness criteria lower bounds for
inputs in transaction tables then we obtain for a scenario
that utilizes these bounds in a model:
-sufficient lower bound conditions for LARC and force levels
in order to be winning or to maintain deterrence with Ground
Combat Forces
-sufficient lower bound conditions for costs, i.e. what
amount of the Gross-National Product (GNP) do we at least
have to sacrifice in a yearly budget for military
committments given by the corresponding scenario.
Further detailed analysis of the effectiveness of
combat element's components is feasible. For example, assume
lower bounds for constant, but refined LARC could be found
which establish lower bounds for weapon system's components
capabilities, reliabilities and availabilities. Many
combinations for this fixed effectiveness offer a variety of
cost alternatives and the efficient and cheapest combination
can be identified that powers up to the required overall
effectiveness of a combat element. On the other hand, for an
input-output analysis, measures as tank driving- hours,
intelligence activities in hours, tons transported in hours,
can be substituted by measures with respect to system's
worth in using MOEs based on LATMW and refined LARC. We
gain insight into the order of force levels, their
individual system's components* effectiveness and their
corresponding costs. Simple, but non-trivial, results
derived from LATMW and very aggregated transaction tables
for an input-output analysis, consistently joined, assist in
solving complex military problems that are mainly concerned
with the consumption of scarce economic resources.
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3. Inputs for Transaction Tab les
We began our development of a MEF for combat models
with a critical analysis of currently commited pitfalls and
shortcomings in constructing these models. One mojor
shortcoming was the inadequate substantiation for cost
considerations. Huge amounts of numbers get cranked in the
yearly Planning, Programming and Budgetting procedure for
the Defense Budget. Political decision makers are sometimes
hard to convince why exactly (x) dollar amounts are required
by the military community to fulfil their missions. We see a
very important improvement, with this regard, in the ease of
application of LATMW models as low resolution
decision- finding aids. They are very transparent and the
sensitivity of Force Posture and Commodity Level changes
with respect to the net-output vector due to limited or
reduced appropriations can be systematically shown. We
propose to change the input quantification of Commodity
Levels of the net-output vector in a transaction table. At
the same time, we demonstrate that a valuable combat model,
such as a differential model, is no freestanding model that
could be produced whenever it is requested. Combat models
are complex and interdependent data processors that only
deliver reasonable results, if consistent information that
further detailed and extended research work on a variety of
models can produce is combined.
In deriving the Concept of Estimable Rates, we
proved that the hazard of a system can be considered as
constituting a Poisson Process. We know then, for example
the rate at which a hardware system's failure occurs, and we
also are able to identify, by means of a damage assessment
model, the kind of failure. The underlying procedure to
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model the component logistics of our system is for example:
First, generate demand for logistical needs; secondly,
determine the estimated time to repair failures (for supply
and maintenance) ; third, use the same assessment routine to
estimate the time that a combat element or system's
component has to stay in the damaged or down state.
One basic aspect of every planning model is the
planning horizon. Thus, to maximize the utilization of the
time systems are effective whithin a time frame, or to
minimize the expected time a system is idle (in input-output
analysis terms the Commodity Levels and Force Postures) is a
consistent effectiveness quantification of Program Elements.
Both failures and down times of system's components follow
independent random processes, failures a Poisson process and
down times, for example, may be lognormal distributions.
The overall stochastic process can in general be formulated
as a compound Poisson process (see for further detail [87] p
132-133). If the Poisson process is inhomogeneous, then the
stochastic process can be sufficiently described, for our
interest, as the expectation of a random number of random
variables (see also [37] p 73-74).
Denote the random number of failures by (N) and the
random variable down time by (T) , then E[N] E[T] is the
expected down time as a measure of system's components idle
state. Subtract from the planned time horizon (for a yearly
budget, e.g.) the expected down time. The resulting
net-operating time, denoted by 0T f is a consistent Force
Posture or Commodity Level effectiveness quantification for
the transaction tableau. It should be noted that we need a
damage assessment model, for example [90], a high resolution
model, such as DYNTACS to generate the damage, a
differential model, such as VECTOR - II which would allow us
by proper adjustment, to estimate desired Estimable Rates
(at different levels of resolution) , and an input-output
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model, for example the Electric Five Years Defense Plan
System [6] to consistently analyze Program Elements'
effectiveness quantifications. The subtraction of down times
from planning horizons is also an improved MOE specification
for all other components of our system to be analyzed in
detail with respect to their economic impact. In effect,
all Force Posture and Commodity Levels have one common
effectiveness criterion combined with their costs, namely
the consumed dollar amounts to produce net-operational
times.
The effectiveness (E) of our systems has been
defined by the relationship E = ARC [availability (A),
reliability (R) and capability (C) ]. These refined LARC,
with specified lower bounds, can have higher values by
reinforcement of system's elements performance
characteristics, change in doctrine and tactics or more
effective evaluation of intelligence etc. . There is no need
to analyze each of possible alternatives separately in a
complex transaction tableau with respect to the net-output
vector. We aggregate their different effects into one single
numerical measure. Arrange the different availability
probabilities as a vector (A) with elements a , the
i
reliability probabilities as a matrix (R) with entries r
ij
and the performance based LARC as a vector (C) with
different values c that may be obtained by incorporating
i
their range dependence, then the overall system's
effectiveness (E) , in accordance with [68], is aggregated in
E =X.£La r c . This formulation seems to be a
i j i ij i
more appropriate Net-Output vector quantification than the




Let us finally relate our results to transaction
table inputs that can be gained by the application of our
modelling improvements for LATMW. Suppose we consider the
Commodity Levels Logistics (CLL) and the Force Postures
Infantry (FPI) , Light Armored Infantry (FPLAI) and Armor
(FPA) . Suppose also that for each of these commodities the
appropriations are categorized in personnel (PERS)
,
procurement (PRO) and operational (OP) costs whose entries
in a matrix are denoted as appropriation costs AP . A cost
ij
accounting system (oriented on the structure of our coherent
systems of combat elements) supplies the total amounts of
dollars spent for the above commodities. Denote their
corresponding entries in a matrix CC . Based on
ij
reliability and availability estimates (from our component
hazards) and from capability quantifications with unrefined
LARC compute the Net-Operational times (OT ) as Commodity
ij
effectiveness measures. The Net-output vector elements as
effectiveness measures for FPI, FPLAI and FPA are the
refined LARC (E , 1=1,..., 3) respectively from our
i
derivation of the quantities E = A C R .
i i i i
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Introducing the same notation for transaction table
submatrizes S, U, D and V as in [6] we relate their elements
to the following above defined quantities with their
corresponding physical meanings:
S = CC /OT
ij ij ij




= Dollars appropriated/Net-Operational time per
Support Element
D = [ CC /OT ]/E
ij ij ij i
= Dollars spent by friendly firers per destroyed
target
V = AP /E
ij ij i










Figure 5 - MOE FOR AN INPUT-OUTPUT TABLE
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Fig 5 shows the matrices S, D, U and V in the
general context with our newly defined elements. With these
notations the primary input matrix R is then
-1
R = [0 (I-S) D + V],
where I is the identity matrix.
Since the appropriation vector W is W = R Y we identify the
-1
term [U (I-S) D Y] as indirect costs and the product V Y
as direct costs with respect to the Net-output vector Y. The
elements of the appropriation vector W represent the total
appropriated dollar amounts for Commodity Postures and Force
Levels. This combination of effectiveness quantification
based on our refined LkRZ formulations and the input-output
table allows us to utilize the same MOEs (the hazards
related to operational time and the refined LARC) that
provide guidance for strategies and tactics exercising LATMW
and in analyzing battle predictions such as
casualty-exchange ratios, force ratios and functional
criterion (e.g. FEBA-movsment distance). As a consequent
extension of this connection of models (the LATMW and the
input-output table) we are able to gather information about
the economic impact of changes of battle predictions in
terms of dollar amounts of the GNP. Our General and
Specific Modelling Considerations ask us to adjust Combat
and Input-Output Models oriented on a MEF and on refinements
of formulations in LATMW. The scientific assessment of
General-Purpose-Forces role primarily depends on the quality
and availability of reproducible inputs for these models.
Therefore, extended and detailed research work must be
devoted to obtain sound estimates for these quantities.
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H. A FIRST-COT SECTOR LAIMW
In order to complete our Design Considerations for LATMW
we give now the formulation of a Sector Combat Model that is
only one example for many possible abstractions of different
combat sector scenarios.
1. Model Assumptions
Let the combatants objective be to move the contact zone
(FEBA) as much as possible from the friendly to the enemy
territory, i.e. the distance of the FEBA-movement gained in
a hostile territory determines the victorious combatant.
Both sides engage armored ground forces and tactical air
forces, i.e,. the combatants in a sector are viewed as
homogeneous forces, but consisting of at least four
components as in our refined LARC formulations. The
FEBA-movement function depends only on the force ratio of
the armored ground forces. If these forces are equal no
FEBA-movement occurs. Ground forces deliver "aimed" fire,
air forces against ground forces "area" fire, and against
air forces "aimed" fire. Both sides of air forces choose air
war strategies, i.e. percentage allocation factors between
air or ground targets. Ground and air forces of the
combatants are enforced by constant replacement rates not
subject to attrition. A conflict terminates, if a side
records a FEBA-movement of 300 km or the battle lasts over
30 days or anyone of the forces reaches their breakpoints
for a fight-to-the finish.
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2. Model Equations and Notation
Denote blue ground forces by (X ) , blue air forces by
1
{Y ) and equivalently (X ) and (Y ) for the red forces. Use
1 2 2
the symbols (E ) and (S ) for i = 1,2 to indicate X 1 s and
i i
Y's replacement rates. The fraction of air forces allocated
to different strategies (air or ground combat) are (u) and
(v) for X and Y air forces respectively. The gained
FEBA-moveraent distance is denoted as (s) . Refined LARC
(viewing each combat unit as a coherent system of the four
components: hardware system, human interface, combat
environment and logistics) are for X denoted by a and for
ij
Y with f for j = 1,2. The value of the second subscript
ij
tells which force is firing to destroy a target accordingly
to the value of the first subscript.
Fig 6 displays the opponents and their strategies for
the attrition process. The following differential equations
descride the combat dynamics (Note that for solving three of
them fourth-order Runge-Kutta, compare [95], numerical
integration approximations are applied in the FORTRAN





Figure 6 - ATTRITION PROCESSES AND BATTLE OUTCOMES







[ (h [x (z)/y (z)-1] + k] dzJ 11
o
with constants h and k and t indicating the time dependence
FEBA-movement model
ds/dt = (h (x /y ) -1) + k
1 1
Ground war
dx /dt = R - f y-vf yx
1 1 11 1 12 2 1
dy /dt = S - e x-ue yx
1 1 11 1 12 1 2
Air war
dx /dt = R - (1-v) f y
2 2 22 2
dy /dt = S - (1-u) s x
2 2 22 2
with x
, y > and < u r v < 1.
i i
Appendix A includes a FORTRAN program that can be
exercised for a set of input parameters (including the
initial conditions for the differential equations)
.
Numerical results in simulating different contingencies with
this program are easily obtainable. The main concern of this
thesis was not to exercise a first-cut differential sector
model of warfare. However, we like to demonstrate with these
concise mathematical formulations and the FORTRAN program
that the main effort for successful combat modelling must
not be spent in the final building and computer
implementation and exercising phase. Professional combat
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model builder are very efficient with this regard. The most
crucial and critical part for a combat model is the early
stage of its design. Only some equations stand foe the whole
spectrum and complexity of abstract formulations of
General-Purpose-Forces problems in a final model. A simple
program code allows us to solve this system of equations.
The magnitude of model input parameters determine the range
of the numerical values of battle predictions for a theater
(in our example a sector) level scenario. Despite of this
significance of inputs into model equations we felt that it
was necessary to address some basic questions like "How",
"Where" and "Why" have some numbers been chosen to express
the effectiveness of forces that are the model driving
inputs. LATMW are then easily exercised with the aid of a
digital computer. Finally, we hope that the variety of our
General and Specific Modelling Considerations help to remind
where one has to start to successfully apply Operations
Research Methods: first of all, identify those conditions to




IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The cost/effectiveness evaluation of alternative
strategies and tactics for General-Purpose Forces for a
Theater-Level Campaign is a very complex and difficult task.
Because of this fact, various dangers exist for committing
pitfalls and shortcomings in model constructions. There are
many "standard" mistakes that may be made in building a
model. These are principally related to the process of
abstracting and aggregating combat phenomena in
theater-level operations. The main thrust of this thesis
has been to establish a Minimum Evaluation Framework (MEF)
for combat models. This MEF provides guidance as to the
maximum amount of abstraction and aggregation that yield
"acceptable" results in modelling combat.
Based on our readings and much contemplative reflection,
we feel that one should explicitly focus on ths following
topic areas before starting to build a combat model:
1. Abstraction of the overall structure of the combined
arms forces (viewed as coherent systems), i.e. the
study of the systems' structure function and those of
their components (branches and other combat influencing
phenomena) that constitute combat dynamics.
2. Aggregation of the quantification (numerical
descriptors) of all system component state outcomes
(functioning or failure), i.e. to obtain measures (from
either soft and/or hard information) of how well do
components function (reliability) and allow to perform
(availability) interrelated combat actions with systems
such as modern combined arms forces.
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3. Utilization of easily applicable mathematical and
statistical methods tailored to abstract and quantify
combat processes with also cheap data collection
procedures that permit to extract the worth of these
systems in duels.
4. Consistent orientation of the analytical formulations
that use the quantified measures of effectiveness on
the desired and defined analysis objective, i.e. the
cost effective evaluation of alternative strategies and
tactics achievable with the spectrum of modern
conventional forces.
5. Validation and verification of all assumption and
formulations that went into a complex model before it
is implemented to assist in Cost Operational
Effectiveness Analysis (COEA) Studies.
All these considerations have to be laid out and viewed
together before the model building even Starrs. Military
experts, scientists and managers are then able, as a team,
to adjust unsound assumptions and formulations or to call
for more detailed research on problem areas.
State-of-the-art combat models (because of their model
designs) have concentrated with different weights with
regard to the above aspects to produce qualitatively
(scientifically) acceptable abstractions and qnantif ications
of military engagements. For example, some model builders
focus primarily on hardware problems, some on particular
branch oriented questions, and others use unsound methods to
aggregate numerical inputs in a complex model.
Therefore, minimum bounds to adequately formulate
combined arms actions in a theater-level scenario have to be
established in order to be able to really address
General-Purpose-Force problems with combat models. One has
to specify these in a Minimum Evaluation Framework for
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combat models that guide combat modellers to achieve this
specifications in models. This will hopefully yield
scientifically sound abstractions of the alternative worth
to operate complex military units with different
capabilities, reliabilities and availabilities, and various
strategies and tactics. The deployed systems on a
battlefield are then expressible as very coherent ones that-
include all decisive components (e.g. hardware systems,
human interface, logistical consumption, resource
allocation, combat environment) . This directs us also to
consistent system effectiveness quantifications oriented on
the desired analysis goal. Capability, availability and
reliability measures of systems (obtainable with means of
our Concept of Estimable Rates) refine Lanchester
Attrition-Rate Coefficients (LARC) as suitable inputs for
LATMW to evaluate alternative systems and their
effectiveness in possible scenarios. He are therefore able
to study the consumption of limited resources by
conventional forces. This is accomplished with an
Input-Output Analysis that considers not only costs, but
also their economic impact in a country.
All these specific modelling considerations concentrate
on achieving the desired analysis objective, i.e. from the
plan to collect data (to extract information about the worth
of systems) to the final formulation of LATMW and
Input-Output models for COEA studies. If one follows our
considerations for modelling efforts this will hopefully
produce differential combat models of real operational use
for quantitatively analyzing General-Purpose-Force problems.
Basically, we have provided guidance to overcome
shortcomings and pitfalls of model assumptions, formulations
and techniques to be applied in LATMW.
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We have also identified in this thesis areas for future
research. If this research were to be done, then hopefully
differential combat modelling would cease to primarily be
viewed as an art that tries to appeal ambitious customers
that argue with different reservations to choose
differential models as aids for an analysis. Systematic and
scientific planning towards a desired objective will produce
fruitful results. The rigorous use of the Scientific Method
allows us to put each step of such plans into realization
(to construct a complex verificable and validiable LATMW)
.
The worth of the Scientific Method, in our particular case,
in exercising LATMW is to lay out numerically quantified
alternative combat outcomes. However, the final decision as
to which strategy and tactic ought to be chosen is, of




FORTRAN PROGRAM FOR A SECTOR LATMW
This example FORTRAN program (included hereafter) for
the theater level sector LATMW formulated in III.H. should
onl y be exercised and used as a tool for any further
analysis, if valid inputs can be supplied, i.e. with
estimated refined LARC, force levels and their replacement
rates. Military decision maker and planners will then with
the Simulation of this routine obtain numerical aids to
assess the cost effects of different strategies and tactics
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